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Civil Liberties and the California Law
of Preemption
By CoLEvA.Ni BLEASE*
THE 1962 decision of the California Supreme Court m In re Lane,'
preempting by nplication the field of the criminal aspects of sexual
activity, stirred up a controversy among local government officials
2
which could lead to fundamental change in the law 3 In magnitude
-A.B., 1952, LL.B., 1955, Uiversity of California, Berkeley. Lecturer in Speech,
Umversity of California, Berkeley. Legislative Representative, Southern California
Branch, American Civil Liberties Union.
158 Cal. 2d 99, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857, 372 P.2d 897 (1962).
2 See, e.g., the following statement of Richard Carpenter, Executive Director and
General Counsel, League of California Cities, contained in a bulletin of the League
addressed to Mayors, Managers and Clerks, November 23, 1965, on file in the office
of the League of California Cities, Berkeley- "Traditionally and historically, cities have
been able for eighty years to enact all types of local regulatory ordinances not m con-
fict with state laws. During that same long period of time courts had held that the
power of cities to enact such ordinances was not in conflict with state law if the
ordinance (1) did not exactly duplicate state law, (2) did not prohibit that which
the state permitted, (3) did not permit that which the state prohibited and (4) did
not invade a field fully occupied or pre-empted by the state. Under this clear and
easily understandable rule cities could always enact more restrictive local regulations
unless the Legislature had enacted a complete scheme of legislation and actually
and expressly occupied the field e.g., vehicle code. In fact, the courts held that local
police power was equal to that of the Legislature unless there was a conflict. "The
Abbott case and the more notorious Lane case changed these traditional rules so that
the court (rather than the Legislature), in the absence of any express legislative intent
to occupy or pre-empt a field of legislation, now determines whether the Legislature
intended to pre-empt a field of legislation to the complete exclusion of local ordinances.
This creates two problems. First, we have no opportunity to argue before the policy-
making body (the Legislature) whether the field should be pre-empted. Second,
no city attorney can reasonably predict whether a local ordinance will be valid if the
Legislature has enacted any legislation on the same subject even though the state
legislation leaves gaps, doesn't meet local needs and does not expressly occupy the field."
3 The proposals for reform have taken many forms. The League of California Cities
sponsored both constitutional amendments and legislation at the 1963 and 1965 ses-
sions of the California legislature to redefine fundamentally the provisions of section 11
of article XI of the Califorma Constitution which requires that local regulations not
"conflict with general laws." 1963 general session: S.C.A. 12 (1963), A.C.A. 30 (1963),
S.B. 1348 (1963), and A.B. 2827 (1963). 1965 general session: S.C.A. 2 (1965),
A.C.A. 13 (1965), A.B. 23 (1965), and A.B. 97 (1965). None of these proposals was
adopted. In recent months an initiative petition, attempting to reverse the Lane decision
and largely confined to the subject matter of sexual activities, has been widely circulated
by a group calling itself Citizens for Decency, anl chaired by Los Angeles County
Supervisor Warren Dom. The petition failed to gain sufficient signatures to qualify for
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and rhetoric, though not in its origins and substance, the controversy
is the equal of the home rule movement of the last century,4 which
produced in Califorma5 an impressive constitutional structure of local
self-government. 6
It is the purpose of this article to examine the current controversy
over the law of preemption, the case law out of which it arose, its
relation to questions of civil liberty, and some of the proposals for
fundamental change in the law It is also the purpose of this article
to demonstrate that the doctrine of preemption by implication did
not begin with the Lane case, but is a doctrine dating back at least
two decades, with roots m the early law of preemption; that the doc-
trine developed partly as a judicial response to problems of constitu-
tional rights, and takes meaning from its origins; that the current
controversy is part of a larger controversy over judicial decisions
regulating police practices and refusal by the legislature to overturn
them; and that the proposals for fundamental reform are thus mis-
conceived.
Judicial Development of the Law of Preemption
I. The Early Law
In 1936, Professor J. A. C. Grant began a study of the California
law of preemption by observing that "there is no branch of the law
more resplendent with conflicting rules and principles and with falla-
the 1966 general election ballot. And more recently, Governor Brown has been called
upon by the League of Califorma Cities and others to make preemption the subject of a
special session of the legislature.
4 See generally McBmN, THE LAw AND THE PIAcTICE OF Mu icnAL Houz RuE
1-17 (1916); Peppin, Municipal Home Rule in Califomza I, 30 CAxm. L. REv. 1 (1941).
[Hereinafter cited as Municipal Home Rule 1]
5 Ibid., Peppin, Municipal Home Rule in Califoama 11, 30 CALIW. L. RLv. 272
(1942); Peppin, Municipal Home Rule in California 111: Section 11 of Article XI of
the Californuz Constitution, 32 CALiF. L. RiEv. 341 (1944). [Hereinafter cited as Muntc-
pal Home Rule 1111
0 The framers of the Califorma constitution of 1879 provided for the incorpora-
tion of cities under general law, CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 6, the framing of special free-
holders charters for cities of over 100,000 population, CAL. CoNsT. art. XI, § 8, pro-
hibitions against legislative interference with certain municipal functions, Cal. Const.
art. XI, § 12 (taxes) and delegation of municipal functions, Cal. Const. art. XI, § 13,
and the sweeping provision, which is the special subject of this article, granting powers
to cities and counties to "make and enforce within [their] limits all such local,
police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws, CAL.
CONST. art. XI, § 11, among others. By subsequent amendment (in 1892 and 1896 re-
spectively), special charters were made available to cities of over 3,500 population,
CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 8, and such cities were exempted from "general laws" as to
their "municipal affairs," CAL. CoNsT. art. XI, § 6.
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ciously subtle and specious reasoning . " A few years later, in
1944, Professor John C. Peppin concluded his exhaustive study of
section 11 of article XI of the Califorma constitution, which forms the
constitutional basis for the law of preemption, by suggesting that the
provision had "introduced much uncertainty and confusion into Cal-
iforma municipal corporation law without resuling in any tangible
compensating benefits."" These comments, which find ready afftirma-
tion today,9 no doubt reflect the enormity of the judicial task, imposed
by section 11, of adjusting and reconciling the respective powers of
State and local governments-a task which characterizes the law of
preemption. The comments also reflect the difficulty of casting the law
of preemption into the mold of easily applied "rules" and its resulting
ad hoc and subject-matter orientation. Indeed, as Justice Tobrmer so
aptly put it at a later date, "the very nature of the test [of preemption]
discloses that its application must be suz generis of the particular field
involved."10
The judicial difficulties apparently began with the framing of sec-
tion 11 of article XI. It provided then, as now, that: "any county, city,
or townshp may make and enforce within its limits all such local,
police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with general
laws." Professor Peppin found its "origin and purposes. exceedingly
obscure," a situation which left the courts bereft of any guiding legis-
lative history 11 Then, as now, the courts were faced with the problem
of answering two basic questions. First, what power is granted by
7 Grant, Penal Ordinances in California, 24 CA.. L. REv. 123 (1936). It is
interesting to note, in view of the thrust of this article, that Professor Grant set out in
a series of articles to study the "overlapping national, state, and local criminal laws
and their effect upon the constitutional rights of persons accused of crime." Ibid.
8 Municipal Home Rule III at 393. Professor Peppin went further to state that it
"would be difficult to demonstrate that California needs it [CAL. CoNST. art. XI, § 11]
any more than the forty-four states who do not now have such a constitutional prov-
sion need it." Ibid.
9 See, e.g., Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Rule
for the Courts, 48 Mnu-w. L. R.-v. 643, 652 (1964).
10 In re Farrant, 181 Cal. App. 2d 231, 234, 5 Cal. Rptr. 171, 172 (1960).
31 Municipal Home Rule Ill at 341-42. Professor Peppin based his conclusion on
the total absence of public discussion or debate at the constitutional convention of
1878-1879 which adopted the provision. Despite the absence of interpretive history,
Professor Peppin felt confident enough at the end of the article to assert that section
11 "probably had as its original purpose the freeing of pre-1879 charter cities from the
many and confusing restrictions of their old charters," and, therefore, it "very prob-
ably [was not aimed at) giving cities and counties power without prior legislative
authorization to make and enforce police regulations on matters which are either
of exclusive state concern or of greater concern to the state than to the city or
county " Id. at 391.
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the authorization to "make and enforce. . local, police, sanitary and
other regulations . ?"' Second, what limitation is placed on the
exercise of such power by the requirement that mumcipal regulations
not "conflict with general laws"?
Some early courts believed that the power granted by section 11
was "just as broad, sweeping and inclusive as the powers with relation
thereto which are vested in the legislature itself ,"1 a view which
Professor Peppm found easily read from the language of the grant.14
This view was in sharp contrast to what Professor McBam said was
the "common understanding [that] such general subjects as crime,
domestic relations, wills and admimstration, mortgages, trusts, con-
tracts, real and personal property, insurance, banking, corporations,
and many others have never been regarded by any one, least of all
by the cities themselves, as appropriate subjects of local control." 5
12 Two additional questions of power, one relating to confinement of the granted
powers to the stated entities, county, city, town or township--and the other to the
territorial application of the powers, implied by the phrase "within its limits," were
also raised by section 11. Both early and later cases prohibited the application of city
ordinances to "conduct outside the boundaries of the city or county " Muniipal
Home Rule III at 348 n.17, and cases cited therein. See, e.g., People v. City of Rich-
mond, 141 Cal. App. 2d 107, 296 P.2d 351 (1956) (annexation); City of South San
Francisco v. Berry, 120 Cal. App. 2d 252, 260 P.2d 1045 (1953) (annexation).
But at least one case has found a power to regulate matters beyond city boundaries
outside of section 11. Southern Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 50 Cal. 2d 713,
329 P.2d 289 (1958) (regulation of city gas lines). As to the entities granted power,
the early cases seem to establish that "section 11 is not only a grant of power to
counties, cities, towns and townships, but is also in effect a prohibition on the legis-
lature vesting the power the section does grant in any agency other than those ex-
pressly designated." Municpal Home Rule III at 359, relying on Gilgert v. Stockton
Port District, 7 Cal. 2d. 384, 60 P.2d 847 (1936), and other cases cited thereto. But
later cases appear to have reversed the limitation on legislative delegation of penal
authority to other kinds of entities. In Moore v. Municipal Court, 170 Cal. App. 2d
548, 339 P.2d 196 (1959) the court said that section 11 is "enabling rather than
restrictive and the legislature may properly delegate to [special agencies] the
power to make [penal] regulations." And see Los Angeles County Flood Control
District v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 51 Cal. 2d 331, 344, 333 P.2d 1, 9 (1958) (dis-
senting opiion).
13 Stanislaus County Dairymen's Protective Ass'n v. Stanislaus County, 8 Cal. 2d
378, 384, 65 P.2d 1305, 1307 (1937).
14 Municipal Home Rule III at 357 n.59. One of the difficulties m reading the
Peppm article is that Professor Peppm's view, or at least his emphasis, seems to change
from place to place. Thus, when discussing the powers granted by section 11 he first
states that "if the section means what it seems to say, it is difficult to see why it does
not in effect [grant] full and complete power to do almost anything " Id. at
343. But some twenty pages later he states: "One reading section 11 for the first time
would probably get the idea that the section was intended to limit the authority
to regulations of local affairs as distinguished from matters of state-wide concern."
Id. at 365. And see note 11 supra.
15 McBAn, Th LAw AN = PRACTIcE oF MuNcr L Homm RuLE 673 (1916).
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Nonetheless, Professor Peppm concluded after a study of the cases
that, though most of them did not so expressly state, and though there
were exceptions,'8 "what the courts really conceived section 11 to au-
thorize was the enactment of penal ordinances."
17
This view, though somewhat less expansive than the language of
section 11 would suggest, leads to the conclusion that section 11
authorizes cites and counties to legislate as to statewide affairs, pro-
viding that there is no conflict with general laws. Accordingly, Pro-
fessor Peppm concluded that "while several district courts of appeal
have stated or assumed, with very little discussion or analysis, that
only regulations of 'municipal affairs' are authorized by cities under
section 11, the supreme court has repeatedly stated or assumed, also
with very little discussion or analysis, that the section authorizes
police regulations by cities on both municipal and state affairs." 8
Judicial construction of "conflict with general laws" was equally
unclear. In In re Sic,'9 one of the earliest cases to face the problem, the
State supreme court held that a mumcipal ordinance punishing "pre-
cisely the same acts" as the general law was m conflict therewith.20
16 Munmpal Home Rule III at 357 n.59.
17 Id. at 355. Professor Peppin placed great reliance on a distinction made in Von
Schmidt v. Widber, 105 Cal. 151, 161, 38 Pac. 682, 686 (1894) that "the 'regula-
tions' which [section 11 authorizes] are rules of conduct to be observed by the
citizens, and cannot by any construction of language be held to include the purchase
of real estate; nor can the power to make such purchase be implied from the authority
to make the regulations." Id. at 351. (Emphasis added.)
18 Id. at 365-66. Professor Peppm also noted, in addition to the cases utiizig the
term "municipal affairs" that for a time "the California courts seem to have performed
a major operation on the section by reading the words 'local, police, sanitary and other
regulations' just as if no comma were present after 'local' and as if local' modified
'police' instead of 'regulations' " Id. at 343. Professor Peppm did not discover a
similar example of grammatical surgery. Though the comma was not dropped from
a paraphrase of the section 11 when the original act of 1883 established a uniform
system of county and township government (Cal. Stat. 1883, ch. 75, § 33, at 308-09),
it was dropped when the act was transferred to the Political Code in 1907 (Cal. Stat.
1907, ch. 282, § 1, at 371). Even though the code was repeatedly amended through
the years until 1929, and subsection 28 was made subsection 31 (Cal. Stat. 1913,
ch. 329, § 31, at 672), the comma between "local" and "police" was never replaced.
The confusion over inclusion of statewide affairs in the section 11 grant of power still
afflicts the courts. See, e.g., the statement in Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal.
2d 674, 681, 3 Cal. Rptr. 158, 163, 349 P.2d 974, 979 (1960), that "a city has no
power to legislate upon matters which are not of a local nature " And see the
confusion of the notions of preemption and municipal affairs in In re Hubbard, 62
Cal. 2d 119, 41 Cal. Rptr. 393, 396 P.2d 809 (1964). But compare the explicit state-
ment in Chavez v. Sargent, 52 Cal. 2d 162, 176, 339 P.2d 801, 809 (1959) that "even
in matters of state-wide concern the city or county has police power equal to that
of the state so long as the local regulations do not conflict with general laws."
19 73 Cal. 142, 14 Pac. 405 (1887).
20 Id. at 146, 14 Pac. at 407.
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The court, in advancing this notion of conflict by duplication, rea-
soned:
It would seem that an ordinance must be conflicting with the general
law which may operate to prevent a prosecution of the offense under
-the general law The Constitution provides that no one shall be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense. If tried and convicted or acquit-
ted under the ordinance 'he could not be again tried for the same of-
fense under the general law 
21
The Sic rule, though repudiated for a time, was reaffirmed and
established during this early period22 and given constitutional status.3
In In re Portnoy,24 the rule was also applied to invalidate a muicipal
ordinance which partially duplicated State law The court held that
the invalid portions of the ordinance could not be severed from the
valid portions; hence, the entire ordinance was void.25
The notion of severability explains a problem that had perplexed
Professor Peppm. He had observed that some ordinances, which ap-
peared to come within the Sic rule, had been upheld. In In re Hoff-
man,26 for example,
where the ordinance required milk sold m the city to contain 3.5 per
cent fats and the state law required all milk sold anywhere m the
state to contain 3 per cent fats a person selling milk containing 2 per
cent fats violates both the ordinance and the law Clearly
prosecution [of such a person] would seem to violate the rule of the
Sic case but California cases have not yet settled the question whether
it does.27
The answer to this problem was clearly explained in People v.
Commons.26 The court said, in analyzing the Hoffman case and others
raising a similar problem, "In each case, the prohibition of the ordi-
nance, as framed, would cover everything prohibited by the [State]
statute, and more, yet in each case the ordinance was upheld -29
21Id. at 148, 14 Pac. at 408.
22 Munwcipal Home Rule III at 380-82.
2 3
1n re Mingo, 190 Cal. 769, 214 Pac. 867 (1923). The court held that the legisla-
ture was constitutionally powerless under CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 11 to authorize mumici-
pal duplication of State criminal law.
2421 Cal. 2d 237, 131 P.2d 1 (1942).
25 Id. at 242, 131 P.2d at 3.
26155 Cal. 114, 99 Pac. 517 (1909).
27 Municipal Home Rule III at 386.
2864 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 925, 148 P.2d 724 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. Los Angeles,
1944). Professor Peppm cites the case, but does not seem to recognize the significance
of its reasoning. See Munwzpal Home Rule III at 387. Perhaps the reason is that the
Commons case came down just prior to the completion of his article m 1944.
2964 Cal. App. 2d Supp. at 934, 148 P.2d at 729-30.
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Relying on the much earlier case of In re Murphy,30 the court con-
cluded that the invalid portions had been severed by construing the
ordinances so as not to include them. Thus in the Murphy case
the court had said that from "this comprehensive description [all
gambling] we must exclude those condemned by the statute [specific
gambling games]. Tins method of defining offenses is not to be
recommended as a model, but we cannot hold that it renders the ordi-
nance void."31 The Commons opinion found fins liberal rule of severa-
bility in keeping with the underlying double jeopardy theory of the
Sic case, for no person could be prosecuted under an ordinance so
construed for a crime punishable under State law It distinguished
the Portnoy case as involving an ordinance winch was "complicated
and [as to winch] the disentanglement of valid from invalid provisions
was difficult." 32 Both the Commons-Murphy33 and Portnoy4 rules of
severability have been frequently followed.3
There remained, however, a number of troublesome aspects to the
Sic rule. In the first place, there was the question whether the juris-
dictional conflict predicated by the Sic rule was more apparent
than real. Professor Grant believed that though the prohibition against
double jeopardy would theoretically deprive the State of the oppor-
tunity to prosecute a person under State law after conviction for an
identical local offense, in reality violations of municipal ordinances
would frequently be "prosecuted in the same courts, under the same
procedure and often by the same prosecuting officers as state of-
fenses."30 Thus there would be no practical inpact upon State ]uris-
diction. However, today, in a number of counties, for example Los
Angeles, there is separation of prosecutorial offices. Moreover, as
emphasized in a recent decision of the State supreme court, "in many
places felonies and misdemeanors are usually prosecuted by different
law offices and there is a risk that those in charge of msdemeanor pros-
ecutions may proceed without adequately assessing the seriousness of
SO 128 Cal. 29, 60 Pac. 465 (1900).
81 Id. at 31, 60 Pac. at 466.
32 64 Cal. App. Supp. 925, 935, 148 P.2d 724, 730 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. Los
Angeles) (1944).
33 See, e.g., In re Hubbard, 62 Cal. 2d 119, 41 Cal. Rptr. 393, 396 P.2d 809 (1964);
In re Farrant; 181 Cal. App. 2d 231, 5 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1960); Retrmner v. Municipal
Court, 90 Cal. App. 2d 854, 204 P.2d 92 (1949), petition for supreme court hearing
denied, 90 Cal. App. 2d 860 (1949).
34 See, e.g., In re Porterfield, 28 Cal. 2d 91, 168 P.2d 706 (1946).
35 See also the discussion of severability in Grant Municipal Ordinances Supple-
menting Criminal Laws, 9 So. CAL. L. Eyv. 95 102-05 (1936).
80 Id. at 109.
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a defendant's conduct or considering whether a felony prosecution
should be undertaken."37
A second problem concerns the continued viability of the double
jeopardy rationale of the Sic rule. The courts have not apparently con-
sidered the logical extension of the Sic rule to ordinances embodying
included offenses.38 Moreover, the duplication rule has been applied
to cases in which the general law carned no penal sanction 9 and in
which neither the general law nor the local ordinance was penal.40
It is possible to conclude, therefore, that the rule against duplica-
tion is both broader and narrower than the double jeopardy rationale
would suggest. It concerns jurisdictional conflicts, 41 arising out of a
conflict in criminal or civil jurisdiction.
A second kind of "conflict" appeared to Professor Peppm to hold
out the hope of an easily discernible rule. As he put it: "Where the city
or county attempts to legalize an act which the legislature has pro-
hibited or to prohibit an act which the legislature has declared lawful
we have an obvious case of conflict "42 But the cases cited by him
in support of this "rule" demonstrate a hidden confusion.43 Although
some of the cited "conflicts" are "obvious," such as the conflict between
a State law prohibiting "bawdy" houses and an ordinance licensing
their operation,44 others assume away important problems, such as the
87 Kellett v. Superior Court, 63 A.C. 880, 886, 48 Cal. Rptr. 366, 370, 409 P.2d
206, 210 (1966).38 See, e.g., the problem raised in In re Bell, 19 Cal. 2d 488, 122 P.2d 22 (1942),
where the court held that there was no violation of the Sic rule. The court said:
"Picketing by acts of violence, however, is an offense distinct from assault, battery,
not, disturbing the peace, or unlawful assemblage, even though it may sometimes
nvolve these acts. The nature of the crime involving violence vanes with the purpose
for which the violence is employed. This ordinance prohibits the use of violence for
the purpose of preventing employees or patrons from entering premises being picketed
in connection with a labor dispute. It therefore defines an offense different from general
acts of violence unconnected with a labor controversy." Id. at 498, 122 P.2d at 28.
(Emphasis added.)
39 In re Porterfleld, 28 Cal. 2d 91, 168 P.2d 706 (1946).
40 Chavez v. Sargent, 52 Cal. 2d 162, 339 P.2d 801 (1959); Stephenson v. City
of Palm Springs, 52 Cal. 2d 407, 340 P.2d 1009 (1959). Compare 40 Ors. CAL. ATT'y
GEN. 114, 119-20 (1962).
41Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal. 2d 366, 371, 125 P.2d 482, 485 (1942), though pur-
porting to rely on the Sic rule, stressed that the mvalidity of a duplicatory conflict
arises from the "inevitable conflict of jurisdiction which would result from dual regula-
tions covering the same ground."
42 Munwtzpal Home Rule III at 380.
4 3 Professor Peppin saw fit to devote but two sentences, and footnote citations to
nine cases, to the problem. Municipal Home Rule III at 380.
44 Farmer v. Behmer, 9 Cal. App. 773, 100 Pac. 901 (1909).
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nature of the authorization involved in a state license,45 or are clearly
not direct at all.46
The central difficulty concerns what "the legislature has declared
lawful," for the normal prohibitory enactment only declares thngs to
be unlawful; it does not affirmatively declare things to be lawful. Thus,
a prohibition against A says nothing about the lawfulness of B, C and
D, except by implication. Within a unified system of law this poses no
problem, for lawfulness can there be viewed as the residue of that
which is declared unlawful. As to penal sanctions this rises to the
level of a constitutional commandment. But when the question arises
as to the power of a subordinate branch of government to regulate the
residue, the problem becomes one either of the intent of the legisla-
ture afrmatively to authorize some conduct or to preempt the field.
The problem is posed by the case of In re Iverson,4 7 in which the
State supreme court held that a local ordinance limiting the filling of
certain alcoholic prescriptions to eight ounces was not in conflict
with a State law limiting such prescriptions to sixteen ounces. The
court said that supplementary local regulations are authorized by
section 11, provided that they are "in keeping with the purpose of the
general law."48 Professor Grant examined the relevance of purpose
in the light of the Iverson facts. "Was [the] statute," he asked,
"intended to prevent an evasion of the state liquor laws through a too
liberal policy of drug store sales, or was it intended to guarantee an
adequate supply of medicinal liquor to those in need of it?"4 The ordi-
nance would be directly in conflict with the statute, given the latter
purpose but not the former. The Iverson court assumed, probably cor-
rectly, that the legislature had the regulatory purpose in mind. None-
theless, as Professor Grant put it,50 "Obviously the application of this
rule requires that the court look beyond the mere words of the statute
to the purpose it is intended to accomplish, since it may be this purpose,
rather than the specific crimes created, which is decisive of the validity
of the local regulations."
A similar problem was posed in Mann v. Scott," in which it was
45 Compare In re Maki, 56 Cal. App. 2d 635, 133 P.2d 64 (1943), cited by Peppin,
with Horwith v. City of Fresno, 74 Cal. App. 2d 443, 168 P.2d 767 (1946), discussed
,nfra as an example of occupation by unplication.
46 In re Means, 14 Cal. 2d 254, 93 P.2d 105 (1939).
47 199 Cal. 582,250 Pac. 681 (1926).
48 Id. at 586, 250 Pac. at 682. (Emphasis added.)
49 Grant, supra note 35, at 101.
50 ibid.
51180 Cal. 550, 182 Pac. 281 (1919).
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claimed that a municipal ordinance requiring that a motor vehicle
always stop at least ten feet to the rear of a stopping streetcar was in
conflict with a State statute requiring only that a stop be made if
necessary for the safety of passengers. In holding that there was no
conflict, the court said:
The ordinance certainly does not attempt to make lawful the perfor-
mance of any act forbidden by the state law It follows that a conflict,
if any, can exist only upon the theory that the ordinance prohibits
that which is affirmatively authorized by -the Motor Vehicle Act. In
short, the appellants are placed under the necessity of contending
that that act affirmatively authorizes motor vehicles to pass a stopping
street car whenever the apparent risk involved in so doing would
not deter an ordinarily prudent and careful driver. We do not so con-
strue the statute. Where the legislature has assumed to regulate a
given course of conduct by prohibitory enactments, a municipality
with subordinate power to act in the matter may make such new and
additional regulations m aid and furtherance of the purpose of the
general law as may seem fit and appropriate to the necessities of the
particular locality 52
In both the Iverson and Mann cases the court went on to discuss
the intent of the legislature to occupy the fields at issue. But as the
analysis above should make clear, there is no logical reason why the
inquiry into the purpose of the statute should not be any different
from any other judicial inquiry into the meaning of a statute in which
its purpose becomes relevant.5 3 As such, the inquiry is not one aimed
at the question of supercession, but is an ordinary inquiry into the
general law 5
4
Unfortunately for the cause of clarity, the courts failed to distin-
guish their ordinary functions in "discovering" the general law from
the separate question of determining whether the legislature intended
to occupy some field to the exclusion of local regulation. Occupation
was thus seen as equivalent to a declaration that nonregulated conduct
in the field was affirmatively authorized.55
52 Id. at 556, 182 Pac. at 283-84. (Emphasis added.)
53 "If a statute is to make sense, it must be read in the light of some assumed
purpose. A statute merely declaring a rule, with no purpose or objective, is nonsense.
If a statute is to be merged into a going system of law, moreover, the court must do the
merging, and must in so doing take account of the policy of the statute-or else
substitute its own version of such policy. Creative reshaping of the net result is thus
inevitable." LxwEELLYr, THE COMMVON LAW TRAD-roN, DEcmN APPEAS, 374
(1960).
54 See, e.g., CAL. CODE Civ. Thoc. §§ 1858-59.
55 See, e.g., Mann v. Scott, 180 Cal. 550, 182 Pac. 281 (1919); Ex parte Daniels,
183 Cal. 636, 192 Pac. 442 (1920).
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Tins conceptual problem probably led Professor Peppin to classify
the case of In re Means" as a case involving a direct conflict. 7 The
Means case held that a mumcipal ordinance requiring the licensing of
plumbers, as applied to plumbers in civil service positions working
on State property, was in "direct conflict" with State "authority" even
though no State law regulating plumbers existed at the tune. 8 The
court reasoned that the State civil service laws "taken as a whole, pro-
vide a comprehensive plan for the selection of state employees." 9
Moreover, the State has a "proprietary capacity to lay down the quali-
fications for its employees."" This language can be read several ways;
as an implication of intent to occupy the field of regulating State
employees; as a construction of the general law as affirmatively re-
quiring only State civil service qualifications of State employees; and
as an assertion that the grant of power under section 11 does not
extend to functions in which the State has a proprietary interest.6
Only under the second reading does there arise a direct conflict with
"general laws."
The problem posed by the Means case is one which Professor
Peppin subsumes under a land of third rule of conflict by occupation
of the field. As he put the question: "Does the legislature by making
[extensive] regulations show an intention to occupy the field and
shut out all local regulations therein and can that intention, if present,
be given effect?"612 After surveying the cases, Professor Peppm con-
cluded:
As a matter of fact with but few exceptions, nearly all of which ap-
pear to have been overruled, the only cases thus far decided under
section 11 which hold that state regulation occupies a field so as to
preclude ordinances which do not directly conflict with them have
been those where the legislature has expressly provided that there
shall be no local regulations on a given subject.68
Professor Peppin did not of course include the Means case in his
list of exceptions.64 Moreover his framing of the question of implica-
56 14 Cal. 2d 254, 93 P.2d 105 (1939).
67Muntczpal Home Rule III at 380 n.124.
58 14 Cal. 2d 254, 260, 93 P.2d 105, 108 (1939).
59 Id. at 257, 93 P.2d at 107.
60 Id. at 258, 93 P.2d at 107.
61 Compare Hall v. City of Taft, 47 Cal. 2d 177, 302 P.2d 574 (1956).
62 Municpal Home Rule 111 at 382.
631d. at 388.
6 Professor Peppm did include the case of In re Simmons, 71 Cal. App. 522,
235 Pac. 1029 (1925), which he states is "seemingly overruled by In re Simmons ,"
199 Cal. 590, 250 Pac. 684 (1926). Muntctpal Home Rule III 388 n.156. As a direct
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tion, limited to an inference from mere extensiveness, served to blur
the conceptual distinctions necessary to an appreciation of the scope
of inferential reasoning possible under section 11. The language of
the cases is not so limited. Thus, in In re Iverson,65 which ultimately
was resolved as a question of express authorization of local regulation
of "intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes" under the Wright Act,66
the court nonetheless stated that "there is not to be found m the pro-
visions of the act any express or implied intention on the part of the
legislature to occupy the entire field There is nothing in the act
from which an intention can be inferred to repeal by implication any
ordinance in existence at the time of its adoption."67 The court thus
suggested that, in the absence of an express statement of nonpreemp-
tion, and given an appropriate statutory context, the court could unply
an occupation of the field.
The constitutional status of the law of preemption under section 11
was apparently of crucial importance to the court in Ex parte Daniels,
68
a case which, like Mann v. Scott,69 involved the Motor Vehicle Act.
But unlike the Mann case, the Act now contained an express provision
stating, in section 22(d), that "limitations as to the rate of speed
herein fixed shall be exclusive of all other limitations fixed by . any
political subdivision . " The supreme court ordered the case re-
holding, Professor Peppin's observation is probably correct, though such a conclusion
does not necessarily invalidate the method of reasoning by implication utilized in the
first Simmons case. Each of the cases dealt with the same set of facts and raised the
same question of whether a Bakersfield ordinance which defined the permissible
percentage of alcohol in a medicinal preparation was in conflict with the State Wright
Act, which regulated the consumption of alcohol pursuant to the eighteenth amendment
to the federal constitution. In the first Simmons case the district court of appeal, acting
pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus, found the Bakersfield ordinance in conflict with
the Wright Act. The court implied from an analysis of the provisions of the Wright
Act that the legislature intended by its enactment to occupy the field to the exclusion of
any local regulation. The case was remanded. Simmons now sought a writ of habeas
corpus in the State supreme court. In the second Simmons case, the court, without
citing the first Simmons case and without considering its reasoning, upheld the Bakers-
field ordinance as not in conflict with the Wright Act. The court relied on a provision of
the Wright Act which expressly provided that "nothing in the act shall be construed as
limiting the power of any city to prohibit the manufacturer [etc.] of mtoxicating
liquors for beverage purposes." This provision had not been considered in the first
Simmons case. Hence it is possible to consider the reasoning by implication in the first
Simmons as valid in the absence of an express authorization of local regulation. The
failure of the supreme court to discuss or otherwise cast doubt on this reasoning
lends credence to the speculation.
65199 Cal. 582, 250 Pac. 681 (1926).
66 Id. at 588, 250 Pac. at 683.
67 Ibid (Emphasis added.)
68183 Cal. 636, 192 Pac. 442 (1920).
69180 Cal. 550, 182 Pac. 281 (1919).
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argued, after it had been conceded by counsel that the ordinance did
conflict with the Motor Vehicle Act, in order to determine whether
"the attempt of the Legislature to prohibit the enactment of municipal
ordinances regulating speed might be an unconstitutional interference
with the regulatory powers granted by the Constitution itself to mu-
mcipalities by article XI, § 11 "70 On this point the court concluded
that "a mere prohibition by the state Legislature of local legislation
upon the subject of the use of streets, without any affirmative act of
the legislature occupying that legislative field, would be unconstitu-
tional and m violation of the express authority granted by the state
Constitution to the municipality to enact local regulations."71 In other
words, the legislature had no power simply to preclude local legisla-
tion. It had, under section 11, to pass a general law and that law had
to be directly7 in conflict with the local regulation m order to super-
sede it.
How then to interpret section 22(d) of the Motor Vehicle Act?
"The difficulty," said the court, "results in . the form of the legis-
lation. The legislature did not, in terms, authorize a vehicle to travel
at any time at the maximum speed fixed by the statute for different
localities, but prohibited the operation of motor vehicles at any time
or place at an unsafe and unreasonable rate of speed "73 The
court then reasoned that even though there was no stated and affir-
mative authorization to drive up to the State maximum speeds, "it
seems to have been the legislative purpose, by the declaration [of
preemption in section 22(d)] to authorize vehicles to travel at
those limits. . ."" The court thus converted by construction a naked
declaration of preemption, which the court recogmzed to be unconsti-
tutional as such, into a means of declaring affirmatively that conduct
not prohibited was to be deemed lawful. It was, in short, but another
way of declanng the general law. It was but a short step from this
reasoning to the conclusion that "the effect of the local ordinance is to
foreclose the question of reasonableness of the speed and to substitute
the judgment of the local legislative body for the judgment of the
jury It is evident that the two plans are in direct conflict .,,75
70 183 Cal. 636, 638, 192 Pac. 442, 443 (1920).
71Id. at 641, 192 Pac. at 445.
72 Once the general law is determined, by whatever process of statutory con-
struction, unplication, legislative history, or other judicially acceptable reasoning, affirma-
tively to authorize some conduct, a local prohibitory enactment in the field of conduct
authorized must directly conflict therewith.
73 183 Cal. at 643, 192 Pac. at 446 (1920). (Emphasis added.)
74 183 Cal. at 643, 192 Pac. at 445.
75 183 Cal. 636, 644, 192 Pac. 442, 446 (1920). (Emphasis added.)
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For the Darnels court, a legislative intent to occupy the field could
not be taken at face value but had to be converted into a general law
In this light, the much-quoted language that "the intent of the legisla-
ture in adopting tins general scheme for the control of motor vehicles
is not to be measured alone by the language used, but by the whole
purpose and scope of the legislative scheme,"70 is to be read as a rule of
liberal construction used to avert a holding of unconstitutionality It
must be added, however, that the Daniels holding did not rule out
other means of determining the general law that involved reasoning by
maplication.
This period of the early law closes with the much-cited case of
Pipoly v. Benson. The Pipoly case is important, not so much for its
holding, which rested on the same express preemption provision at
issue in the Daniels case, as for giving emphasis to the language in
Daniels-that the intent of the legislature is not to be measured by lan-
guage alone-as a possible liberal rule of occupation by unplication.
Nonetheless, Professor Peppm's conclusion that most of the cases
finding an occupation of the field involved an express statement of
preemption appears, with the exceptions of the Means78 and first
Simmons 9 cases, to be correct. There may, however, be an additional
reason for this. As Professor Peppm states, there had been "frequent
use by the legislature of provisions either expressly prohibiting or
expressly permitting local regulations ",80 He attributes this to a
legislative response to judicial decisions. But perhaps he had the
matter standing on its head. At the beginning of the article, Professor
Peppm, in discussing the powers granted by section 11, rejected a con-
struction giving cities and counties a "broad and nebulous 'police
power"" because "such a construction would have flown in the face of
the rule of strict construction of powers of municipal corporations-a
rule as well established in 1879 as it is today .. "I" This rule of strict
construction limited the powers of municipal corporations to powers
expressly granted and powers necessarily or fairly Implied or incident
to the express grant.82 If this be the case, then it can be reasoned that
76 Id. at 642, 192 Pac. at 445. (Emphasis added.)
7720 Cal. 2d 366, 125 P.2d 482 (1942). Although Pipoly is the last significant
case of the early penod, the next period does not really begin until 1946. See part II of
the text, rnfta.
78 14 Cal. 2d 254, 93 P.2d 105 (1939).
79 71 Cal. App. 522, 235 Pac. 1029 (1925). See note 64 supra.
80 Munwipal Home Rule III at 390.
81 Id. at 346. (Emphasis added.)
82 Id. at 346 n.14.
[Vol. 17
the courts were following the legislature. Moreover, most of the
leading cases involved statutes-the Motor Vehicle Act; the Wright
Act-which contained express authorizations of local regulation. The
addition of a statement of express preemption in such statutes signaled
not the felt constitutional need expressly to state an intention to
preempt but clearly to spell out that the express authorization was
strictly limited to that authorized.
The early law contained the seeds of a much richer development.
As a result of this development the court could distinguish between
implied general laws and implied conflicts-could expand upon the
notion of general laws to include public policy, could find duplicatory
and direct conflicts with such general laws, and could construe legisla-
tive intent in the light of the "whole purpose and scope of the leg-
islative scheme." As will be seen, these seeds germinated in the second
period of the development of the law of preemption.
II. Judicial Development of the Law of Preemption
After 1946: Constitutional Rights, Public
Policy and Implied Preemption
The problems of the nature, scope and limitations on the power
conferred on cities and counties by section 11 of article XI of the Cal-
iforma constitution, which confused the courts in the period prior to
1946, continued to plague them thereafter. Professor Peppm's con-
clusion that the power granted by section 11 is limited to the enactment
of penal ordinances,83 though apparently supported by some later deci-
sions,"4 does not accurately reflect the range of judicial opinion. The
courts have held or assumed, for example, that section 11 authorizes
such non-penal matters as the establishment and maintenance of a city
hospital, 5 the employment of a physician,86 the exaction of parking
fees, 7 the adding of fluorides to municipal water supplies, 8 and the
83 Municipal Home Rule III at 368.
84 Johnston v. Board of Supervisors, 31 Cal. 2d 66, 75, 187 P.2d 682, 692 (1947);
see also Miller v. Fowle, 92 Cal. App. 2d 409, 206 P.2d 1106 (1949), petition for
supreme court hearing denied, 92 Cal. App. 2d 413 (1949).
85 Beard v. City & County of San Francisco, 79 Cal. App. 2d 753, 755, 180 P.2d
744, 745-46 (1947).
SO County of Mann v. Dufficy, 144 Cal. App. 2d 30, 300 P.2d 721 (1956), petition
for supreme court hearing denied, 144 Cal. App. 2d 37 (1956).
8 7 Downing v. Municipal Court, 88 Cal. App. 2d 345, 198 P.2d 923 (1948), petition
for supreme court hearing denied, 88 Cal. App. 2d 352 (1948).
88 deAryan v. Butler, 119 Cal. App. 2d 674, 260 P.2d 98 (1953), petition for su-
preme court hearing denied, 119 Cal. App. 2d 684 (1953).
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contracting of garbage services.8 9 And the State supreme court has held
that section 11 does not confer powers to regulate "such sovereign
activities as the construction and maintenance of [state] build-
nags "0 Moreover, the courts still reflect the confusion as to whether
section 11 grants power "even in matter of state-wide concern,"91 or
grants "no power to legislate upon matters which are not of a local
nature "92 Lastly, the courts have continued to restrict the applica-
tion of section 11 powers to cities and counties93 and to conduct within
their territorial boundaries.9 4
The most important changes in the law after 1946 have occurred in
the judicial interpretation of what constitutes a "conflict with general
laws." Though the seeds of these changes could be found in the early
law, their germination can most fruitfully be traced to the year 1946.
In that year there began what can be viewed as two lines of cases. The
first focused on the meaning of "general laws," with the notion of
"conflict" playing a derivative and subordinate role. The second line of
cases focused on the notion of "conflict" and thus on the intent of the
legislature to occupy a field to the exclusion of local regulation theren.
Both lines of cases made use of judicial powers of implication; the first
to imply the general law, the second to imply an intent to preempt.
A. The General Law as Public Policy: The
Influence of Constitutional
Principles.
In 1946 the supreme court of California, in In re Porterfield,95
unanmously struck down a Redding ordinance which (in part) in-
posed a flat license tax upon the right of a paid labor organizer to solicit
umon members. The court held that the ordinance directly "contra-
venes the declared public policy of this state that workmen shall have
89 E.g., Matula v. Superior Court, 146 Cal. App. 2d 93, 303 P.2d 871 (1956);
Ponti v. Burastero, 112 Cal. App. 2d 846, 247 P.2d 597 (1952); Davis v. City of
Santa Ana, 108 Cal. App. 2d 669, 239 P.2d 656 (1952), petition for supreme court
hearing denied, 108 Cal. App. 2d 686 (1952).
90 HaU v. City of Taft, 47 Cal. 2d 177, 183, 302 P.2d 574, 578 (1956); accord,
In re Means, 14 Cal. 2d 254, 92 P.2d 105 (1939); see also Vagm v. Board of Supervisors,
230 Cal. App. 2d 286, 40 Cal. Rptr. 760 (1964); Town of Atherton v. Superior Court,
159 Cal. App. 2d 417, 324 P.2d 328 (1958).
91 Chavez v. Sargent, 52 Cal. 2d 162, 176, 339 P.2d 801, 809 (1959).
92 Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. 2d 674, 681, 3 Cal. Rptr. 158, 163, 349
P.2d 974, 979 (1960); see also Wilson v. Beville, 47 Cal. 2d 852, 306 P.2d 789 (1957).
93 See note 12 supra.
94 Ibid.
95 28 Cal. 2d 91, 168 P.2d 706 (1946).
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full freedom of association and self-organization. 6 The court bottomed
its determination of the general law upon section 923 of the Labor
Code, which declares that it is the public policy of the State to favor
the freedom of individual workmen to associate, organize and bargain
collectively 97 But it analogized the rights protected to fundamental
constitutional rights. The court said:
It is, we thmk, in its relationship to the public policy of the state
if not in its relationship to freedom of speech, the type of tax recently
condemned by the Supreme Court of the United States Here,
the license tax obviously operates to make conditional and to restrict
the 'fall freedom' of self organization which the state law declares
and protects.98
The court also struck down another part of the Redding ordinance
on specific constitutional grounds.9D The Porterfield decision reflects a
blend of constitutional principle and law of preemption which would
come to characterize many of the following major cases. The decision
also reflects the conceptual distinction between a direct conflict with
an implied general law-here public policy-and an implied conflict.
The court did recognize, however, the close relationship between the
two, m result if not m theory It relied, not only on the oft-cited case of
Pipoly v. Benson,100 but on the two cases from the early period, In re
96 Id. at 96, 168 P.2d at 710. (Emphasis added.) The Porterfield case apparently
attracted little attention at the time, and the only review of it concluded that the
"decision reached by the court appears sound and subject to little question." Note, 35
CAmn. L. REv. 146, 149 (1947).
97 The court did not suggest that its determination of public policy was based upon
the common law powers of the court. But, though CAL. LAnoR CoDE § 923 does con-
tam and express statement of statutory policy, the declaration appears to be limited to
the sections immediately preceding it---4.e., "in the interpretation and application of
thts chapter," ibid, emphasis added-and thus the court's determination goes beyond
its statutory context. See Berke & Brunn, Local Right to Work Ordinances: A New Prob-
lem n Labor and Local Law, 9 STAN. L. REv. 674, 682 (1957). The Attorney General
thus reads the case as expanding the meaning of § 923 "to be a general independent
declaration of the public policy of this state. "35 Ops. CAL. Aa'r'Y. GEN. 191, 195
(1960).
98 In re Porterfield, 28 Cal. 2d 91, 117-18, 168 P.2d 706, 723 (1946). The court
cites Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), and Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S.
103 (1943), cases in which local ordinances, as construed and applied, required reli-
gious colporteurs to pay flat license taxes as a condition of the pursuit of their consti-
tutionally protected activities. The courts found the application of such flat license
taxes to be violations of the first amendments protection of the free exercise of religion.
99 The court held that the Bedding ordinance broadly authorized the city council
to deny a license on grounds that might encompass picketing and other conduct which
"may be performed in the exercise of civil liberties, guaranteed by both our federal
and state constitutions." Id. at 114, 168 P.2d at 721.
10020 Cal. 2d 366, 125 P.2d 482 (1942).
March, 1966] CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PREEMPTION
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Means'01 and In re Simmons,1 2 which held that local regulation was
precluded by implication.1
3
The Porterfield reasoning formed the basis for a series of State su-
preme court decisions striking down local right-to-work ordinances." 4
In the principal case, Chavez v. Sargent,10 5 the court stated that "of
significance in umpelling a conclusion that no part of the local ordinance
can be effective, is the fact that in aspects wherein it does not substan-
tially either parallel or breach specific state legislation it conflicts
with a general legislative declaration of policy" 0 6 The court made it
clear in the succeeding paragraphs that it considered the basic problem
to be the determination of the general law It is significant that the
court recognized the possibility, though it claimed not to decide the
question, that "decisional law, on a subject of state-wide concern" may
come within the meaning of "general laws" in section 11 of article XI
of the California constitution. 07 The actual determination of the gen-
eral law occupied many pages. But the court concluded that the legis-
lature, though not enacting a completely detailed scheme of regulation,
"has declared both a general policy and basic regulations in inplemen-
tation thereof winch are fully comprehensive of the field" of
jurisdictional strikes and union shop or security agreements.0 8
The Chavez opinion is long and rambling.10 9 It purports to find
the public policy in: section 923 of the Labor Code (the same section
relied on in Porterfield) read m part materta with the Jurisdictional
Strike Act;110 leading decisions in the field of labor law; the discussions
of law writers; and the apparent general principles of labor law 111 As
in Porterfield, the court viewed the rights at stake as fundamental and
101 14 Cal. 2d 254, 93 P.2d 105 (1939).
102 71 Cal. App. 522, 235 Pac. 1029 (1929).
10 3 In re Porterfield, 28 Cal. 2d 91, 116, 168 P.2d 706, 722 (1946).
104 Stephenson v. City of Palm Springs, 52 Cal. 2d 407, 340 P.2d 1009 (1959);
Retail Clerks' Union v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 222, 339 P.2d 839 (1959) partially
overruled by Petn Cleaners, Inc. v. Automotive Employees, Laundry Drivers, 53 Cal. 2d
455, 2 Cal. Rptr. 470, 349 P.2d 76 (1960); Chavez v. Sargent, 52 Cal. 2d 162, 339 P.2d
801 (1959).
105 Ibul.
106 Id. at 177, 339 P.2d at 810. The court cites In re Porterfield, 28 Cal. 2d 91,
115-18, 168 P.2d 706, 721-23 (1946).
107 52 Cal. 2d at 177, 339 P.2d at 810.
108 Id. at 178, 339 P.2d at 811.
109 One commentator has called the Chavez opinion a "sixty page textbook of
dicta. " Margolin, Duties and Rights of California Unions: A Study in Policy Changes,
11 HAsaTmNs L.J. 23, 38 (1959).
110 CAL. LABOR CoD §§ 1115-20, 1122.
113 Chavez v. Sargent, 52 Cal. 2d 162, 191, 339 P.2d 801, 819 (1959).
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constitutional in nature. It read section 923 of the Labor Code as a
"governmentally declared Bill of Rights" for labor,1 1 2 and quoted in
full the many-paged text of a publication of the American Civil Liber-
ties Union entitled Democracy in Labor Unions.113
After determining that the general law affirmatively embraced the
field of jurisdictional strikes and union security agreements, the court
concluded that the ordinance in question conflicted with the general
law because it "partially duplicates that policy msofar as it prohibits
jurisdictional-organizational assaults on unwilling employe-employer
relationships" and directly conflicts with that policy by prohibiting
closed shop or union shop agreements. 4 The remaining portions of the
ordinance were found to be not severable n1 5 on the reasoning advanced
in In re Portnoy.-"
At the outset of the opnnon the court offered an alternative ground
of decision, based upon the line of occupation-by-implication cases,117
but the whole tenor and nport of the case is to focus on the question
of the general law which, once determined, is found partially to du-
plicate and partially to conflict directly with the local regulation. The
court relied on the same reasoning to strike down similar right-to-work
ordinances in Retail Clerks' Union v. Superior Court,1"" and Stephen-
son v. City of Palm Springs.1 9
The importance of the reasoning employed in these cases can be
illustrated by comparing it with a case involving a similar public-policy-
based reasoning but not involving any preemption question. In
Schwartz-Torrance Investment Corp. v. Bakery Workers' Union,120 the
California supreme court invalidated a trespass conviction, under a
State statute, of labor union members who picketed a bakery located
112 Id. at 194, 339 P.2d at 821.
113 Id. at 195-96, 339 P.2d at 821-22.
114 Id. at 213, 339 P.2d at 833. (Emphasis added.)
115 Id. at 214, 339 P.2d at 833-34.
11621 Cal. 2d 237, 131 P.2d 1 (1942). And see the discussion of the Murphy-
Commons severability rule, supra.
117 The court said: "State regulation of a subject may be so complete and detailed
as to indicate an intent to preclude local regulation. In this connection it may be
significant that the subject is one which, m our view, as in Tolman v. Underhill
p. 713 [7] of 39 Cal. 2d, requires uniform treatment throughout the state." 52 Cal.
2d at 177, 339 P.2d at 810.
118 52 Cal. 2d 222, 339 P.2d 839 (1959). The court said: "Here, as in the Chavez
case the ordinance contravenes the state-wide statutory policy , likewise, the
ordinance partially duplicates state-wide statutory policy. "Id. at 226-27, 339 P.2d
at 841-42.
119 52 Cal. 2d 407, 340 P.2d 1009 (1959).
120 61 Cal. 2d 766, 40 Cal. Rptr. 233, 394 P.2d 921 (1964).
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on the private property of a shopping center. The court said: "Picket-
ing by a labor union constitutes an integral component of the process
of collective bargaining; as such it involves the exercise of a right which
is both statutorily and constitutionally sanctioned." 21 The court also
reasoned, in the alternative, that "the interest of the union rests
upon the solid substance of public policy and constitutional right."
122
If we were to assume, for the purposes of analysis, that public policy
was the sole ground upon which the Schwartz-Torrance case were
based and that (somehow) 123 such a public policy were not considered
to be a "general law" within the meaning of section 11 of article XI of
the California constitution, a most interesting result would follow. The
union members would be protected against the state trespass convic-
tion but would not be protected against a municipal ordinance regu-
lating the same conduct. In other words, the policy-making powers of
the courts, recognized as valid in the absence of a preemption question,
would be invalidated by municipal action. Local governments would
thus be invested with power to invade what had been recognized as
a proper province of the courts.
This example demonstrates that the normal lawmaking powers
of the courts, whether invoked in the construction of an ambiguous
statute or the making of a common-law-based public policy, 2' do not
alter their character when involved in the reasoning process used in
determining the "general laws" under section 11 preliminary to the
determination of a possible direct conflict with a municipal ordinance.
B. Occupation by Implication: The Influence
of Constitutional Principles.
The Forterfield case in 1946 marked the beginning of an expanded
judicial treatment of preemption by implication, though it focused on
the process of implying a general law In the same year a district court
of appeal expressly relied on a theory which focused its reasoning by
implication on the intent of the legislature to preclude local regulation.
121Id. at 768-69, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 234, 394 P.2d at 922.
1
2
2 Id. at 774, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 238, 394 P.2d at 926 (Emphasis added.)
1231 f an amendment to section 11 of article XI of the California constitution were to
be adopted restricting the meaning of "conflict with general laws" so as to limit the
power of the courts in the field of preemption to determinations of an express intent
to preempt and if this were to be construed so as to preclude the determinations of
general law by implication, then the result outlined above would obtain. Compare the
problems of interpretation raised by the constitutional amendment to § 11 proposed
by the League of California Cities, discussed tnfra.
124See Hughes v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 850, 198 P.2d 885 (1948); James
v. Marnslp Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944).
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In Horwith v. City of Fresno, 25 the court invalidated a municipal
ordinance which sought to impose additional qualifications by license
upon State qualified and licensed electrical contractors. "The state
license," said the court, "implies permission to the licensee to conduct
his business at any place within the state. This permission should not
be circumscribed by local authorities." 26 The court relied on Pipoly
v. Benson127 for the general proposition that an "ordinance is invalid
if it attempts to impose additional requirements in a field which is fully
occupied ..
The Horwith court recognized that the inference from licensing to
authorization required an assumption as to the intent of the legislature
to preclude further and local regulation. Later decisions have consis-
tently recognized that State regulatory licensing implies a legislative
intent to preclude additional regulations, 29 though some courts have
appeared to confuse regulatory licensing with licensing for purposes
of revenue.8 0
The Horwith case opened the way for further determinations of
occupation by implication. In 1947, in Eastlick v City of Los An-
geles,'31 the State supreme court unanimously invalidated a municipal
ordinance which established a procedure more stringent than State
law for the filing of clais under the State Public Liability Act. The
court found that the State clamis act was a "general scheme for the
presentation of such liability claims . [and] with respect to the
subjects covered . occupies the entire field and . impliedly
125 74 Cal. App. 2d 443, 168 P.2d 767 (1946).
126 Id. at 448-49, 168 P.2d 770. (Emphasis added.)
127 20 Cal. 2d 366, 125 P.2d 482 (1942).
128 74 Cal. App. 2d at 448, 168 P.2d at 770.
129In re Groves, 54 Cal. 2d 154, 4 Cal. Rptr. 844, 351 P.2d 1028 (1960); Agnew
v. City of Los Angeles, 51 Cal. 2d 1, 330 P.2d 385 (1958); Agnew v. City of Culver
City, 147 Cal. App. 2d 144, 304 P.2d 788 (1956); Agnew v. City of Los Angeles, 110
Cal. App. 2d 612, 243 P.2d 73 (1952); City & County of San Francisco v. Boss, 83
Cal. App. 2d 445, 189 P.2d 32 (1948); People v. Williams, 207 Cal. App. 2d Supp.
912, 24 Cal. Rptr. 922 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. Alameda County, 1962).
230 Sato, Munwipal Occupation Taxes in Californa: The Authority to Levy Taxes
and the Burden on Intrastate Commerce, 53 CALIw. L. RE v. 801, 810-16 (1965). Pro-
fessor Sato offers the interesting "speculation" that the courts may have for a time
preempted not only municipal licensing for regulatory purposes but municipal licensing
for revenue purposes by a covert analogy to the federal constitutional proscription
against burdens on interstate commerce. If so, such cases would be of a piece with
the cases discussed at length below, which appear to have used a policy factor derived
by analogy to federal constitutional principles as the justification for nnplymg an
occupation of the field. The analogized constitutional principles, so to speak, provide
the missing premise in the judicial reasoning.
13129 Cal. 2d 661, 177 P.2d 558 (1947).
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precludes control to that extent by mumcipal or local regulation." 32
The court quoted language from Mann v. Scott 3, that occupation must
be determined "in every case upon an analysis of the statute and of
the facts and circumstances upon which it was intended to operate.'u 4
And it confined several earlier cases, 35 offering a potentially more re-
strictive view of preemption by implication, to their facts (express
legislative statements of non-preemption) .136
The Eastlick doctrine of preemption by implied occupation of the
field was expressly followed in many subsequent cases. In Wilson v.
Beville,13 7 for example, the court invalidated a mumcipal procedure
shortening the time within which to file a clain for land taken by
eminent domain. The court said: "The Legislature has provided a com-
plete and detailed system for exercising the right of eminent domain
and assessing compensation." 3 The court was influenced in its reason-
mg by the fact that the matter of eminent domain was of "statewide
concern' 3 9 and that constitutional principles were potentially at
stake.140 Other cases following Eastlick held the fields of building
regulations for school buildings,'4 ' and claims for industrial accidents
142
to be ipliedly preempted.
132 Id. at 666, 177 P.2d at 562. (Emphasis added.)
133 180 Cal. 550, 557-58, 182 Pac. 281, 284 (1919).
134 29 Cal. 2d at 666, 177 P.2d at 562.
135 Natural Milk Producers Ass'n v. City & County of San Francisco, 20 Cal. 2d
101, 124 P.2d 25 (1942); In re Iverson, 199 Cal. 582, 250 Pac. 681 (1926); In re
Simmons, 199 Cal. 590, 250 Pac. 684 (1926).
136 29 Cal. 2d at 666, 177 P.2d at 561.
137 47 Cal. 2d 852, 306 P.2d 789 (1957).
138 Id. at 860, 306 P.2d at 794.
139 Id. at 859, 306 P.2d at 793. The court seemed to imply that the powers granted
by section 11 are limited to local affairs. The court said: "Assuming a charter may
require the presentation of a claim, it cannot enact statutes of limitations. That is
a matter of statewide concern." Id. at 861, 306 P.2d at 794. Compare Abbott v. City of
Los Angeles, 53 Cal. 2d 674, 681, 3 Cal. Rptr. 158, 163, 349 P.2d 974, 979 (1960).
140 The court said: "If the city may enact such legislation the land owner is
denied equal protection of the laws for the state statute would fix the limitation
where the condemnor was a public utility but a different one would prevail where the
condemnor was a mumcipal corporation. There is no distinction between such con-
demnors. The city along with public utilities are made equally liable by the Constitu-
tion." Id. at 861, 306 P.2d at 794.
141 Hall v. City of Taft, 47 Cal. 2d 177, 302 P.2d 574 (1956). The preemption
by inplication theory was framed in the alternative. The court also held that such an
invasion of the sovereign activities of the state was beyond the power granted by
CAL. CoNsT. art. XI, § 11. id. at 183, 302 P.2d at 578.
142 Healy v. Industrial Accident Commission, 41 Cal. 2d 118, 258 P.2d 1 (1953).
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1. The Loyalty Oath Cases
The importance to implied preemption of constitutional principles,
which undergirded the implied public policy cases of Porterfield and
Chavez and which could be discerned in the license cases143 and
Beville, became prominent m the resolution of five cases involving
loyalty oaths adopted by the State, Los Angeles County, and the Um-
versity of California. Significantly, the cases began, and were briefed"
and presumably argued, as raising primarily questions of constitutional
law Though no mention was made of preemption, four of the five cases
were resolved as issues of preemption. 145
The five cases, taken together, suggest a complicated interweaving
of constitutional principle and law of preemption. Their analysis prop-
erly begins with the one case, Pockman v. Leonard,14 which did not
turn on preemption. At issue was the constitutionality of the Levering
Act,147 a State statute, adopted a few short months after the beginning
of the Korean War, which required all public employees' 48 to take an
oath disavowing advocacy of violent overthrow of the government.
The oath used language borrowed from an oath required of Los An-
geles city employees, which had been upheld against constitutional
143 See note 130 supra.
144 The supreme court propounded a number of questions to counsel in each of the
cases. None of the questions concerned the issue of preemption. The following ques-
tions, taken from the Supplemental Brief on Behalf of Petitioner, Bowen v. County
of Los Angeles, 39 Cal. 2d 714, 249 P.2d 285 (1952) and Hirschman v. County of Los
Angeles, 39 Cal. 2d 698, 249 P.2d 287 (1952) illustrate the concerns of the court:
1. "What persons in public service, state or local, come within the scope of the
provisions of Section 3, Article XX, of the state Constitution: 'and no other
oath, declaration, or test shall be required as a qualification for any office or
public trust? "
2. "In what respect is there any substantial difference between the oath prescribed
by Section 3 of Article XX and that required by the Levering Act?"
3. "Are the recent decisions in the United States Supreme Court, in particular
Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716, and Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494, decisive upon the question raised with respect to the Federal
Constitution, including bill of attainder, ex post facto law, free speech and right
of assemblage, due process, and self-incrimination and exaction of confession by
coercion?"
145 Hirschman v. County of Los Angeles, 39 Cal. 2d 698, 249 P.2d 287 (1952);
Tolman v. Underhill, 39 Cal. 2d 708, 249 P.2d 280 (1952); Bowen v. County of Los
Angeles, 39 Cal. 2d 714, 249 P.2d 285 (1952); Fraser v. Regents of University of
Califorma, 39 Cal. 2d 717, 249 P.2d 283 (1952).
146 39 Cal. 2d 676, 249 P.2d 267 (1952).
147 CAL. GOv'T CODE §§ 3100-09.
148 The Levering Act first declared all public employees to be civilian defense
workers and then required the oath of them. Ibid.
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attack in Garner v. Board of Pub. Works.149 Undoubtedly the court
considered 50 the Garner case dispositive of the precise constitutional
questions.5 1 It did recognize, however, that there was an area of po-
litical and religious belief and opinion, not reached by the oath but
deserving of protection. The court said: "The [Levering] oath is
obviously not a test of religious opinion. Neither does it compel dis-
avowal of any political belief . The word 'political' is not
applicable to advocacy of a belief in [violent] overthrow of the gov-
ernment . "1152
The concern of the court for the protection of "legitimate" religious
and political belief became apparent in the treatment of another issue
tendered by the case-whether the provision in section 3 of article XX
of the State constitution, 53 requiring a simple declaration of govern-
mental support, and stating that "no other oath, declaration or test shall
be required as a qualification for any office or public trust," invalidated
the Levering oath. The court answered "No," but then asserted that the
term "office or public trust" was not limited to elective offices but in-
cluded "every state and local officer and employee." 54 The court con-
strued the phrase broadly, so it said, because:
This construction as in accord with the basic purpose of safeguarding
the public and its servants by forbidding oaths and. declarations re-
garding matters that bear no reasonable relationship to govern-
mental service and particularly those that involve political and reli-
gious beliefs. Persons in the lower levels of government are ]ust as
much entitled to this protection as those in higher positions.'55
In form, the provision at issue was analogous to a declaration of
preemption-"no other oath . shall be required . "" And the
court's broad construction of the beneficiaries of the restriction was
clearly intended to provide a protection against invasion of that area
-the area of political and religious opinon-which, n the court's
149 341 U.S. 716 (1950).
150 See question 3 in note 144 supra.
151 Pockman v. Leonard, 39 Cal. 2d 676, 685-87, 249 P.2d 267, 273-74 (1952).
152 Id. at 686, 249 P.2d at 273.
153 CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 3 (1879).
154 Pockman v. Leonard, 39 Cal. 2d 676, 684, 249 P.2d 267, 272 (1952).
155 Ibzd. (Emphasis added.) The use of the phrase "reasonable relationship to
governmental service" is, m the context of the Garner case, a test of constitutionality.
Thus, in the Pockman case, the court upheld the constitutionality of the Levering
oath (in part) on the grounds that "past conduct and loyalty have a reasonable rela-
tionshtp to present fitness and trustworthiness, and public servants may properly be
reqtured to furmsh reformation regarding past membership in organizations [advocating
overthrow] " Id. at 687, 249 P.2d at 274. (Emphasis added.)
1 5 6 CAL. CoNsT. art. XX, § 3 (1879).
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view, was entitled to constitutional protection.157 In a companion case,
Hirschman v. County of Los Angeles,' 58 the court made the point ex-
pressly by reading the "holding m Pockman v. Leonard [as stat-
ing] that all persons in public employment are protected by the consti-
tutional prohibition against the imposition of religious or political tests
as a qualification for 'any office or public trust."",5 9
The Pockman reasoning was clearly in evidence when the court
reached the companion case of Tolman v. Underhill,160 a case arising
before enactment of the Levering Act. The court held that a special
oath of non-disloyalty, 161 required of University of California em-
ployees by the Regents of the University, was preempted by State
legislation. The court reasoned that provisions of the Government
Code, 62 when read together, showed that the Legislature intended
that State employees take only the simple oath of affirmation then con-
tamed in the constitution. The field of oaths for State personnel was
thus preempted by inplication. The court relied for precedent on
Pipoly and Eastlick, and in language paralleling the Pockman reason-
mg said:
[T]he loyalty of state employees is not a matter as to which there
may reasonably be different standards and different tests but is, with-
out doubt, a subject requirmg uniform treatment throughout the
state. [T]he Legislature has enacted a general and detailed
scheme requiring all state employees to execute a prescribed oath
relating to loyalty and faithful performance of duty, and it could not
have intended that they must at the same time remain subject to any
such additional loyalty oaths as the particular agency employing
them might see fit to impose. Multiplicity and duplication of oaths
157 This explains the reason for upholding the constitutionality of the Levering oath
for, as the court viewed the constitutional principle at stake, advocacy of violent over-
throw of government was simply not a matter of religious or political opinion and thus
not entitled to protection.
158 39 Cal. 2d 698, 249 P.2d 287 (1952).
'59 Id. at 704.
160 39 Cal. 2d 708, 249 P.2d 280 (1952).
161 It is important to note that the Uiversity of Califorma oath was materially
different from the Levering Act oath in that it required, in addition to the disavowal
of advocacy, that the oath taker swear that he had "no commitments in conflict with
[his] responsibilities with respect to impartial scholarship and free pursuit of
truth." Id. at 709-10, 249 P.2d at 281. It therefore could not be argued, as in the
Pockman case, that the oath was substantially the same as the oath then required by the
constitution.
162 CAL. GOVT CODE §§ 1360, 1364, 18150. As the court read the sections: § 1360
required a state "officer" to take the affirmative oath then provided by CAL. CoNsT.
art. XX, § 3; § 1364 made it unlawful to remove an "officer" for refusal to comply with
any additional test other than those required under civil service or retirement laws;
and §§ 18150-58 impliedly extended these provisions to all state employees.
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and declarations would not only reflect seriously upon the dignity of
state employment but would make a travesty of the effort to secure
loyal and suitable persons for government service.
16
The Tolman case, read in conjunction with Pockman, leads to the
conclusion that the constitutional principles were introduced by the
court into the doctrine of preemption by way of the policy factor of
statewide uniformity And this constitutionally-derived policy was
utilized as a premise justifying (m part) the nplication that the legis-
lature intended to occupy the field of loyalty oaths for State em-
ployees.'6 4
163 39 Cal. 2d at 713, 249 P.2d at 283.
164 The other companion cases generally support these conclusions. Although it had
been argued by the counsel for Los Angeles County that CAL. GOV'T CODE § 1364,
prohibiting the removal of any state "officer" for refusal to comply with any additional
test other than required under civil service laws, provided for an express intention not
to preempt the field of loyalty tests where required by civil service qualifications, the
contrary conclusion was required by the court's disposition of Fraser v. Regents of
Umversity of Califorma, 39 Cal. 2d 717, 249 P.2d 283 (1952). The Fraser case, un-
like Tolman, involved no provision permitting the argument (as with CAr.. Cov'T
CODE § 1364) that the field was expressly preempted or non-preempted. Thus, in Fraser,
the court said that the Levering Act preempts the field of loyalty oaths for all public
employees (not just State employees as in Tolman) for "the language and purpose of
the statute, together with the reasoning of our decision in Tolman v. Underhill, make
it evident that the act fully occupies the field of legislation on the subject of loyalty
oaths for public employees." 39 Cal. 2d at 718, 249 P.2d at 284. The two last cases
also me~it attention. In Hirschman v. County of Los Angeles, 39 Cal. 2d 698, 249
P.2d 287 (1952), the court held that a Los Angeles County loyalty oath, challenged
as of a date prior to the adoption of the Levering-Act, was not preempted because the
Government Code sections at issue in the Tolman case applied only to State employees.
Unlike Pockman, the court refused to read the term "officer," this time in CAr.. Gov'T
CODE § 1360, as encompassing all public employees. The court distinguished Tolman
by arguing that the Government Code sections there at issue "clearly have no applica-
tion to persons employed by a county " Id. at 704, 250 P.2d at 146. Thus the
court suggests that the policy factors in Pockman that were applied in Tolman-that is,
a sub-constitutional solicitude for constitutional prnciples-are applicable only where
the language of the statutory enactments at issue are sufficiently vague. However, there
is the additional reason, articulated note 161 supra, that the Los Angeles oath, a virtual
duplicate of the Levering Act oath, jeopardized no opinions of a religious or political
nature. It also should be mentioned that the matter at issue, apart from the specific
persons whose jobs were at stake, was virtually moot. The Los Angeles oath was invali-
dated by the Levering Act according to the Bowen and Fraser cases. Moreover, the
impending passage of Proposition 4 on the November 1952 ballot (these cases were
decided but two weeks in advance of the election), placing the Levering oath in the
California Constitution, would have made any meaningful action, apart from the imme-
diate persons involved, impossible. Lastly, the case of Bowen v. County of Los Angeles,
39 Cal. 2d 714, 249 P.2d 285 (1952), held that the Levering Act preempted the field
but ruled adversely to the petitioner who, although signing the affirmative oath of the
then constitutional requirement, refused to sigu the Levering oath.
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2. The Abbott Case
Constitutional principles again played a prominent, if less visible,
role in the preemption decision of Abbott v. City of Los Angeles."6 5
There the court unanimously held that a Los Angeles criminal registra-
tion ordinance was npliedly preempted by State law The ordinance
made it a criminal offense for persons convicted of certain crimes-
generally felomes and certain misdemeanors-to remain in the city
for more than five days without registering with the Chief of Police.'66
Like the loyalty oath cases, the Abbott case began, and was briefed
and presumably argued, as a question of federal constitutional law
The criminal registration ordinance at issue had previously come before
the United States Supreme Court in Lambert v. Californi . 67 The
Supreme Court held that the ordinance "violates due process where it
is applied to a person who has no actual knowledge of his duty to
register, and where no showing is made of the probability of such
knowledge."6 " The court's theory was grounded on due process notions
of notice.
Engramed in our concept of due process is the requirement of notice.
Notice is sometimes essential so that the citizen has the chance to
defend charges. [Tihe principle is . appropriate where a per-
son, wholly passive and unaware of any wrongdoing, is brought to
the bar of justice for condemnation in a criminal case. Were it
otherwise, the evil would be as great as it is when the law is written
in print too fine to read or in a language foreign to the community. 69
Although the court did not stress the point, it was aware of another
facet of the registration law, its use as a device to circumvent the re-
quirements of the criminal law The appellant, Mrs. Lambert, had been
"arrested on suspicion of another offense, [but] was charged with a
violation of [the] . . registration law' 70 The court cited generally
to a law review note as offering a "comprehensive review of these
registration laws."' 1 The note concluded that an immediate objective
of registration ordinances is "the incarceration or expulsion of undesir-
165 53 Cal. 2d 674, 3 Cal. Rptr. 158, 349 P.2d 974 (1960).
166 Los ANGELES, CAL., MUNCIPAL CODE §§ 52.38-52.43 (1955). The ordinance
also required registration upon entering the city on five or more occasions during any
thirty-day period.
167 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
168 Id. at 227.
169 Id. at 228, 230.
170 Id. at 226.
'711d, at 226 n.1.
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ables, rather than the registration of criminals,"172 and that, specifically,
the Los Angeles ordinance was designed as a means of convicting sus-
pected crmunals for failure to register where evidence of commission
of suspected offense was lackmg.173
The Lambert case was roundly criticized for its brevity and lack
of clarity.174 Nonetheless, the opinion appeared to establish a broad, if
vague, principle that due process notions of fairness require, at least
as to certain crnmes of ommssion, fair warning of the conduct required
by the law
Following the Lambert decision, Mrs. Lambert was again brought
to trial. She sought a writ of prohibition in the State supreme court on
the ground that the registration ordinance was unconstitutional on
its face.175 At the same time, the American Civil Liberties Union of
Southern California instituted the Abbott case, an action for declara-
tory relief also testing the constitutionality of the ordinance.1 7 6 The two
cases were heard together. The principal- opinion was written in the
Abbott case.
The State supreme court, in an opinion by Justice Peters, recognized
the difficulty of the constitutional problems posed by the registration
ordinance. It said "if we were to interpret the ordinance by im-
plication to require knowledge as an element of the offense the deci-
sion in Lambert v. California would not be controlling."1 77 It cited
the large literature on the subject of registration ordinances and the
fact that "most of the writers attack the policy and constitutionality
of criminal registration statutes."17 8 The court elected, instead, to
base its reasoning on the law of preemption,179 an issue which
172 Note, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 60, 63 (1954).
173 Id. at 63 n.17.
174 See, e.g., Dubin, Mens Rea Reconsidered. A Plea for a Due Process Concept of
Criminal Responsibility, 18 STAN. L. REv. 322, 382 & n.273 (1966), and articles cited
therein, id. at 382 n.273.
175 Lambert v. Municipal Court, 53 Cal. 2d 690, 3 Cal. Rptr. 168, 349 P.2d 984
(1960).
176 Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. 2d 674, 3 Cal. Rptr. 158, 349 P.2d 974
(1960).
177 Id. at 681, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 163, 349 P.2d at 979.
178 Id. at 679 n.5, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 162 n.5, 349 P.2d at 978 n.5.
179 Under the existing California law, the court would probably have been obliged
to imply a scienter provision in the ordinance. In Pockinan v. Leonard, 39 Cal. 2d 676,
249 P.2d 267 (1952), for example, the court said "the oath provisions relating to mem-
bership can reasonably be construed as referrng only to affiliation with organizations
known by the employee to belong to the proscribed class, and each clause of the oath
must be interpreted as requiring knowledge of the character of the group " Id. at
685, 249 P.2d at 272. Such a scienter requirement was required in order to save the
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was not briefed or argued except on petition for a rehearing. S0
Preliminarily, the Abbott opinion confused the powers granted by
section 11 of article XI over statewide affairs with the protection given
municipal affairs under section 6 of article XI. After clearly indicating
that it was about to discuss the section 11 powers, the court said:
A city has no power to legislate upon matters which are not of a local
nature [citing Pipoly v. Benson 81 and Lossiman v. City of Stock-
ton 82 ] . When there is doubt as to whether an attempted regula-
tion relates to a municipal or to a state matter, or if it be the mixed
concern of both, the doubt must be resolved m favor of the legislative
authority of the state [citing Ex parte Darnels8 3 and Lossman,
supra.].18 4
Each of the supporting citations clearly distinguished between the
municipal affairs provisions of section 6 of article XI and the pre-
emption provisions of section 11 of article XI. Until the Abbott case,
the law had been clear that the provisions had separate and distinct
functions. In Pipoly,8 5 for example, the court said: "Where 'municipal
affairs' [of chartered cities] are concerned local regulations are
superior to the provisions of a state statute if there is a conflict between
the two." 86 By contrast, under section 11, municipal regulations are
always subordinate to conflicting State legislation. Thus, in Pipoly the
court had first determined that the ordinance in question was not a
"mucipal affair" and then looked to the issue of preemption. A con-
trary holding on the issue of "municipal affairs" would have precluded
a section 11 determination of preemption.
The Abbott case used holdings on section 6 questions of municipal
affairs to limit the powers granted under section 11 to matters which
oath from a holding of unconstitutionality. Compare Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183
(1952). If the court had so construed the registration ordinance to include a proper
scienter provision it would have faced constitutional intricacies of a large order. See, e.g.,
the articles cited note 174 supra. The court noted: "The present case appears to be the
first to come before this court involving the constitutionality of such a 'criminal registra-
tion' ordinance." Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. 2d 674, 679, 3 Cal. Rptr. 158,
162, 349 P.2d 974, 978 (1960).
180 Counsel for local governments seeking a rehearing argued: "We think it sig-
nificant that the sole ground relied upon for reversal in this case was neither a ground of
decision in the courts below nor argued by counsel." Brief of Amici Curiae in Support
of Respondents Petition for Rehearing, p. 3.
18i 20 Cal. 2d 366, 369, 125 P.2d 482, 484 (1942).
1826 Cal. App. 2d 324, 327-28, 44 P.2d 397, 399 (1935).
183 183 Cal. 636, 639-40, 192 Pac. 442, 444 (1920).
18453 Cal. 2d at 681, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 163, 349 P.2d at 979.
18520 Cal. 2d 366, 125 P.2d 482 (1942).
186 Id. at 369, 125 P.2d at 484.
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are of a 'local nature."87 This interesting result, if correct, would return
the section 11 law to the days when the term "local" in the section 11
grant of power was used to modify the powers granted. 88
On the issue of preemption, the Abbott court chose high ground
upon which to base its holding. It recognized that the Los Angeles
ordinance partially duplicated 8 9 and partially directly conflicted 90
with State law It could therefore have invalidated the ordinance at
least to the extent that the conflicting provisions were not severable.' 91
Instead, the court held that the legislature had impliedly intended to
occupy the field of "crime prevention and criminal apprehension" and
therefore "has preempted the very field of registration as a means of
apprehension of criminals."
192
The reasoning underlying the implication of occupation is sadly
muddied. One passage from the opinion suggests that the legislature
intended an occupation, without more, "by expressly requiring registra-
tion in some instances and by inferentially rejecting it in others."193
But the tenor of the opinion suggests that the implication of occupa-
tion was justified both by the pattern and nature of State registration
legislation and the policy factor of statewide uniformity The court
found in the pattern of "state enactments concerning recidivistic crim-
187 53 Cal. 2d at 681, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 163, 349 P.2d at 979.
188 See note 18 supra, and accompanying text.
189 "The ordinance is made specifically applicable to the sex offenders
mentioned in section 290" of the Penal Code. 53 Cal. 2d at 686, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 166,
349 P.2d at 982.
190 The court offered a number of examples of direct conflict. The ordinance required
persons to register whose convictions had been set aside under CAL. PEN. CODE. § 1203.4.
Id. at 688-89, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 168, 349 P.2d at 984. Moreover, the State registration law
"carefully provides for actual notice of the requirement of registration; the ordinance
does not." Id. at 688, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 168, 349 P.2d at 984. In part, the court seems to be
confused as to the difference between a direct and an implied conflict. It says, for
example, that the ordinance is in conflict "in the conventional and strictest sense of the
word" in that it provides for a shorter stay within the city (five days as compared to
sixty by the State) as requiring registration. Id. at 688, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 167, 349 P.2d
at 983. Yet, on the face of these requirements, the ordinance merely provides for a more
stringent requirement. To conclude that the legislature, in specifying a sixty-day stay
before registration, intended to preclude registration upon a shorter visit requires an
implied intention of some sort. The court could have made such an implication by
analogy to the license cases--viewmg registration like licensing in terms of an implied
freedom from further restrictions-but it did not do so. In any event, there is no direct
conflict in the above example.
191 See In re Portnoy, 21 Cal. 2d 237, 131 P.2d 1 (1942).
192 53 Cal. 2d at 684-85, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 165, 349 P.2d at 981. The court was
obviously concerned that a more narrow holding would allow the conflicts to be "cured
by deleting therefrom all application to sex offenders." Id. at 686, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 166,
349 P.2d at 982.
193 Id. at 685, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 165-66, 349 P.2d at 981-82.
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mology a clear policy based upon the dual presumptions that
certain criminals are recidivistic and others are not, and that certain
types of crime require registration and others do not." 94
The court bolstered this plausible statutory construction by resort
to the policy of statewide uniformity '95 Relying on the Tolman case,
the court said:
What was there said regarding the enactment of a detailed scheme
and the requirement of uniform treatment throughout the state is
even more applicable to crnme prevention and detection than it is to
tests for loyalty. It is equally true that any legislation which
would deprive a class of citizens from moving freely between locali-
ties within the state is such a subject as requires uniform treatment.
196
As in Tolman, the court has here coupled the policy of statewide
uniformity with a principle of constitutional ongin-the right to free
movement or travel. The notion of free travel had been raised by Ab-
botts counsel. They had argued that the registration ordinance placed
an unreasonable restriction upon the class of convicted persons of "the
right to move from state to state, from city to city and within the
city ,u97 At the time of the Abbott case, the Supreme Court had
just recognized that the "right to travel is a part of the 'liberty of which
the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the
Fifth Amendment."1 9 Subsequently, the court expanded upon the
right, applying standards evolved from first amendment cases,199 and
stating that it applied to "travel within the United States" as well as to
travel outside of the United States.00
Whether or not the courts would conclude that a registration ordi-
194 Id. at 686, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 166, 349 P.2d at 982.
1957The court's use of the notion of statewide uniformity as a basis for a determina-
tion of implied occupation suggests that not only was the court confused about the
relationship of §§ 6 and 8 of article XI, but also failed to see the importance of its
confusion. If the court consistently argued that section 11 of article XI did not grant
a power over statewide matters, then there would have been no need to engage in any
reasoning concerning preemption. The court's view of the statewide importance of
registration provisions would then suggest that Los Angeles had no power, in the first
instance, over registration of felons. For the court to reach the issue of preemption pre-
supposes that the power to enact muicipal registration ordinances exists in the absence
of a conflict, whether direct or implied. The court thus inconsistently reasoned that
§ 11 grants no power over statewide matters; that registration is a statewide matter;
that nevertheless we shall assume that the power to require registration exists in the
absence of a conflict.
196 53 Cal. 2d at 688, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 167, 349 P.2d at 983.
197 Bnef for Appellant, p. 19.
198 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958).
199 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
2 0 0 Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 15 (1965) (dictum) (Emphasis by the Court).
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nance unwarrantably infringes upon such a right to travel is problem-
atical.20 1 But, there is little doubt that the principle underlying the
right influenced the court's decision m Abbott and the companion
Lambert case.202 The Abbott case grew out of constitutional ferment.
It was resolved on grounds partially traceable to constitutional con-
cerns. It thus fits into the pattern of the loyalty oath cases and their
predecessors and strongly suggests the use of the doctrine of implied
preemption both as a subconstitutional ground of resolution of consti-
tutional questions and as embodying constitutionally-denved principle
as policy ]ustifymg an implied occupation of a field.
3. The Lane Case
The dust from the Abbott case had hardly settled when the State
supreme court was presented with the case of In re Lane.203 The Lane
case, like the loyalty oath cases and the Abbott case before, began as a
test of the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance, in tbis case a Los
Angeles ordinance20 4 makmg "resorting," a euphemism for fornication,
a crime.
205
The Lane case reached the supreme court by way of habeas corpus.
It was argued twice and resulted in two sets of opinions. In the differ-
ence between these opinions lies the real significance of the court's
final decision. In the first decison,20 6 a majority of the court, in an opin-
ion by Justice McComb, found the Los Angeles resorting ordinance in
201 The Aptheker case would require a balancing test. Under it, the court would
have to determine the purpose of the registration ordinance-whether it was a legitimate
purpose; the inpact of the ordinance upon an interest in travel; the availability of
alternative means for achieving the purpose, if legitimate, without infringing upon the
interest m travel; and, lastly, if alternative means were lacking, whether the asserted
regulatory interest was more important than the interest in travel. As the Court put it:
"The breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed in the light of less drastic
means for achieving the same basic purpose." 378 U.S. at 508. Under such a test a
court might well consider the diminished constitutional rights of certain convicted per-
sons.
202 Lambert v. Municipal Court, 53 Cal. 2d 690, 3 Cal. Rptr. 168, 349 P.2d 984
(1960).
203 18 Cal. Rptr. 33, 367 P.2d 673 (1961), vacated, In re Lane, 58 Cal. 2d 99, 22
Cal. Rptr. 857, 372 P.2d 897 (1962).204 Los AwGaros, CAL., MumcrmL CODE, § 41.07 (1955).
205 The term "resorting" derives from the fact that the ordinance made it a crime
for any person to "resort to" any of an enumerated list of places (virtually any place
except a tree) "for the purpose of having sexual intercourse with a person to whom he
or she is not married " Ibtd. Carol Lane had been convicted on several counts of
"resorting," on evidence that she "went from her living room to her bedroom in her own
home for the purpose" of fornication. 58 Cal. 2d at 102, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 858, 372 P.2d
at 898.
206 n re Lane, 18 Cal. Rptr. 33, 367 P.2d 673 (1961).
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conflict with State law, which preempted the field of the criminal
aspects of sexual activity by implication.
The McComb opinion pursued a brief but confusing line of reason-
Ing. It first appears to repeat the confusion of the Abbott case between
sections 6 and 11 of article XI.207 It then proceeds in a few short para-
graphs to argue: "An examination of the Penal Code shows clearly that
the State has occupied the field with regard to the criminal aspects of
sexual activity As evidence of this fact, we need only refer to
the following Penal Code sections . ,,208 There followed a listing of
the State code sections in the "field." Next, since the State law had not
made sinple forication or adultery a crime, "it is therefore clear that
the Legislature has determined by implication that such conduct shall
not be criminal in this state."20 9 The opinion relied mainly on the Ab-
bott case and emphasized that language which purported to find an
implied preemption of criminal registration "by expressly requiring
registration in some instances and by inferentially rejecting it in
others."210
The sparseness and directness of the opimon leads easily to the con-
clusion that the court was deriving the implication solely from the
extensiveness of State regulation. Indeed that was the prine interpre-
tation given the opimon by cities and counties appearing anuci curiae
on the petition for a rehearing. As the Los Angeles County brief put
its chief argument: "There is iio authority to support the holding of this
court that an intention to occupy the field can be Implied simply be-
cause the legislature has legislated on a subject."21 Justice Dooling in
dissent emphasized the majority opinion as holding "that merely from
the fact standing alone that the Legislature has legislated in a field can
its intention to exclude additional local legislation in the same field be
implied." 212
It is important to stress that Justice Dooling, though dissenting, did
not rule out occupation by implication, but only that implication which
rested solely on "the fact standing alone that the Legislature has legis-
207 The court directly quoted a portion of the language in the Abbott case which
merged the municipal affairs notions of § 6 with the preemption notions of § 11. See
note 184 supra, and accompanying text.
208 18 Cal. Rptr. 33, 34, 367 P.2d 673, 674 (1961), vacated, In re Lane, 58 Cal. 2d
99, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857, 372 P.2d 897 (1962).
20918 Cal. Rptr. at 34, 367 P.2d at 674. (Emphasis added.)
210 18 Cal. Rptr. at 35, 367 P.2d at 675. (Emphasis added.) See note 193 supra.
211 Supplemental Brief for the County of Los Angeles and others as Amcus [sc]
Curiae on Behalf of Respondent, p. 1.
21218 Cal. Rptr. at 38, 367 P.2d at 678 (1961). (Emphasis added.)
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lated m a field . .,"21 He analyzed the preceding preemption by
implication cases and concluded: "In every one of them the court found
some additional factor or factors to support its conclusion that the
Legislature had intended its legislation to occupy the field."214
The supreme court, after a rehearing, vacated the first Lane deci-
sion and handed down a new opinion. Although the result was not
changed, the reasoning by which the result was reached showed a
dramatic reemphasis and an implied rejection of the notion that an
implication could be founded on mere legislative action in a field.
Justice McComb altered the thrust of the majority opinion and Chief
Justice Gibson, with Justices Peters and Traynor, added a concurring
opinon to provide a "more complete discussion of the authorities and
the principles relating to occupation of the field ",215 justice Dool-
ing again dissented, but completely rewrote his dissenting opinion to
reflect the altered thrust of the majority opinions.216
The emphasis of the new McComb opinion was placed on the struc-
ture and plan of legislative action in the field of sexual activity Mc-
Comb purported to find the "Penal Code Sections covering the criminal
aspects of sexual activity . so extensive in their scope that they
clearly show an intention to adopt a general scheme for the regulation
of this subject."2 17 A new and altered enumeration of Penal Code Sec-
tions was next included, along with a repetition of the excerpted Ab-
bott language.218 Little else was added, and the McComb opinion
standing alone might have been viewed, despite its rhetoric, as a mere
tinkering with the first opinion.219 It was probably for this reason that
218 ibid.
214 Ibid. Justice Dooling also commented on the majority reliance on the Abbott
case. He said: "While the language, divorced from the rest of the opinion, quoted from
Abbott by the majority might seem to support the conclusion reached by the majority
in this case, a reading of the entire Abbott opinion demonstrates that the court was
careful to find other grounds in other statutory enactments to support its conclusion
18 Cal. Rptr. at 39, 367 P.2d at 679. And see note 193 supra, and accompanying text.
215 58 Cal. 2d at 106, 22 Cal. Bptr. at 861, 372 P.2d at 901.
216 Justice Dooling argued: "I concede that as to statutes requiring affirmative
action, i.e., registration, the filing of claims, the obtaining of licenses, etc., the require-
ments for such affirmative action may be well intended to be exclusive of additional
requirements and in effect may amount to an implied legislative determination that if
such affirmative requirements are met, nothing more of affirative action can be re-
quired. The hiatus in the reasoning of the majority in this case is found in the attempt
to transfer this concept to purely prohibitory legislation." Id. at 112-13, 22 Cal. Rptr.
at 865, 372 P.2d at 905. (dissenting opinon) (Emphasis added.)
217 Id. at 103, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 859, 372 P.2d at 899. (Emphasis added.)
218 See note 210 supra, and accompanying text.
219 Support for this view can be obtained from Justice McComb's reference to the
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justice Gibson added the concurring opinion, an opinion wich repre-
sents the clearer view of the new reasoning.
220
The key feature of the Gibson reasoning, apart from its rejection
of a fision of section 6 and section 11 notions, 221 was the introduction
of the policy factor of statewide uniformity Chief justice Gibson said:
The subject under consideration here requires uniform treatment
throughout the state. Modem methods of transportation have led
people to travel from one location to another more frequently than in
the past. Under these circumstances much unnecessary confusion
would result if each locality were to enforce different rules with re-
spect to the subject involved here. The subject is not one affecting
only an isolated group of citizens but is one involving the concerns of
people generally, and it should be legislated upon accordingly 
222
Chef Justice Gibson did not elaborate on the application of this
policy to sexual conduct. But it would not be difficult to surmise that
the impact of a "multiplicity of divergent regulations ",223 on sex-
ual conduct would be to entrap an unwary and transient populace.
There seems latent in the Gibson policy the kind of due process prob-
lem of notice that concerned the United States Supreme Court in
Lambert v. California.2 4 The transient Californian is no more likely
to expect a non-statewide standard of sexual behavior than the ex-con-
vict could expect a local registration ordinance. A policy of uniformity
in this area would thus serve to protect a due process notion of fairness
without posing an ultimate test of constitutional power.
The Gibson opinion also made reference to another due process
problem, one which was raised in an amicus brief by the American
Civil Liberties Union.225 The brief argued that the Los Angeles resort-
Lane opinion in is dissenting opinion in In re Allen, 59 Cal. 2d 5, 27 Cal. Rptr. 168,
377 P.2d 280 (1962), a case decided on grounds other than preemption. He said:
"In In re Lane and the cases there relied on, we found, on the basis of the extensive
coverage of the subject matter that the Legislature had intended to occupy the
particular field." Id. at 11, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 172, 377 P.2d at 284. The absence of the scope
and scheme language and the apparent reliance on mere extensiveness suggests this
conclusion. Ibid.
220 The Gibson opinion has been cited as if it were the opinion in the Lane case.
45 Ors. CAL. ATT'y. GEN. 140, 141 (1965).
221 The opinion dearly stated that as to municipal affairs "local regulations are
superior to state statutes. " 58 Cal. 2d at 106, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 861, 372 P.2d at 901.
The McConb opinion dropped all reference to this point.
222 Id. at 111, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 864, 372 P.2d at 904 (concurring opinion).
223 Ibid
224355 U.S. 225 (1957).
225 The ACLU brief also recognized the dose relationship between the due process
and preemption arguments. 'While not necessary to the argument here being made
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mg ordinance was designed to permit conviction for alleged violation of
the crime of prostitution without proof of that crime 228 M violation of
due process of law 227 It quoted from statements of the chef of police
and the city attorney and a city council resolution to the effect that
the purpose of the resorting ordinance was to circumvent the necessity
of proving the commercial element m the crime of prostitution, a pur-
pose since confirmed again by the city attorney 
228
Justice Gibson saw the problem as one of due process, and, follow-
ng the ACLU argument, stated:
Even if the ordinance be viewed as a measure against prostitution
winch is enforced only where consideration is suspected to exist, this
use of the ordinance makes the police and prosecuting officials the
sole ]udges of whether consideration is involved. The fact that the
existence of consideration may not always be easily shown cannot,
it is not amiss to point out that under settled rules of pre-emption, the City could not
enact an ordinance prohibiting prostitution, whether in the light of the present Penal
Code section 647(10). The City should not be permitted, therefore, to do by
indirection however subtle, what it cannot do directly. This is particularly true when
the City's method involves a violation of basic rights The fact that the effort to
get around the state requirement is cast in the form of an ordinance, should not give
pause. 'In determining what is due process of law regard must be had to substance, not
to form."' Brief Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, p. 8, In re Lane, 58 Cal. 2d
99, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857, 372 P.2d 897 ('1962).
226
Bnef Anicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, pp. 1-11.
22 7 The brief relied on a long line of cases, including Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S.
157 (1961); Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 206 (1960); De Jonge v.
Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 362 (1937). One of the constitutional problems in such a due
process challenge is the establishment of the legislative purpose behind the ordinance.
For, lacking a clear determination of purpose, the crime could be considered merely one
of fornication, a regulation probably within the constitutional powers of the legislature.
But see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). For an incisive examination of
the constitutional problems in determining legislative purpose, see BicxaL, Tm LE&sr
DA r.Eoous BRANcE 208-21 (1962).
228 "An important distinction between an ordinance prohibiting 'resorting' and a
state law prohibiting 'prostitution', is the element of 'consideration', that is, to prove
prostitution it is necessary to prove a financial transaction. This makes it virtually inpos-
sible for our police to cope with the prostitution problem in Los Angeles." Statement
of Roger Arnebergb, City Attorney of Los Angeles, Before the Assembly Committee on
Criminal Procedure, Sacramento, Califorma, September 21, 1965. Mr. Amebergh added
an interesting bit of testimony concermng the standards for determining whether the
crime of "resorting" had occurred. "Under our old 'resorting' ordinance it was possible
to curtail the activity of a prostitute. Upon seeing conduct such as mentioned, or upon
seeing a serviceman leave a bar with a female, go directly to a hotel or motel and
immediately engage in an act of sexual intercourse, the police officer had sufficient
probable cause to make an arrest for the act of 'resorting.' The fact that the male was
caucasian and the female negro, or vice-versa, or that the male was old and the female
young, or vice-versa, and that promptly after meeting and exchanging a few words they
left for a room, was additional reason to believe that parties are bent upon resorting for
the specific purpose denounced by the ordinance." Id. at 10-11.
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of course, ]ustify departing from the fundamental principle that every
element of a crime must be proved by sufficient evidence. 22
9
4. In re Hubbard and the Aftermath of Lane
The Lane decision was widely interpreted by muicipal authorities
as inventing the doctrine of preemption by implication.230 It was pre-
dicted that vast fields of local regulation would be preempted. But
most courts followed Chief Justice Gibson's caveat that "whether the
state has fully occupied the field with respect to any given subject
depends upon considerations which will necessarily vary and must
therefore be determined m every case without prejudging the result
as to subjects not before the court."231 In particular, the court upheld
the validity of local regulations to submit the issue of fluoridation to a
local initiative,232 to enact a transient room tax-33 or a business tax, 234
to regulate loitering m pedestrian tunnels, 23 5 to regulate land level-
rng,23 6 to restrict certain dangerous weapons,237 and to determine the
wisdom of developing certain tidelands for oil and gas.238 The Attorney
General gave opinons upholding the validity of ordinances regulating
specific motor boat activities, 239 health requirements of children's
boarding homes, 240 local lobbying activities,24 1 and mobile home
parks,242 and requiring non-discrimiation clauses m school construc-
tion contracts.243
22958 Cal. 2d at 112, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 865, 372 P.2d at 905 (concurring opinion).
230 See, e.g., Statement of Roger Arnebergh, City Attorney of Los Angeles, Before
the Assembly Committee on Criinnal Procedure, Sacramento, California, September 21,
1965, p. 2.
23158 Cal. 2d at 110, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 864, 372 P.2d at 904 (concurring opinion).
282 Hughes v. City of Lincoln, 232 Cal. App. 2d 741, 43 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1965).
233 Atlas Hotels, Inc. v. Acker, 230 Cal. App. 2d 658, 41 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1964).
234 People v. Williams, 207 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 912, 24 Cal. Rptr. 922 (App. Dep't
Super. Ct. Alameda, 1962).
235 Gleason v. Municipal Court, 226 Cal. App. 2d 584, 38 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1964).
236 County of Colusa v. Strain, 215 Cal. App. 2d 472, 30 Cal. Rptr. 415 (1963).
237 People v. Jenkins, 207 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 904, 24 Cal. Rptr. 410 (App. Dep't
Super. Ct. Los Angeles, 1962); Cf. People v. Bass, 225 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 777, 33 Cal.
Rptr. 365 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. Los Angeles, 1963).
23 8 Higgins v. City of Santa Momca, 62 Cal. 2d 24, 41 Cal. Rptr. 9, 396 P.2d 41
(1964).
23945 Ors. CAL. Arr'y GiN. 122 (1965).
240 43 Ors. CAL. Arr'Y GEN. 218 (1964).
24141 Ors. CAL. Aa'ry GEN. 86 (1963).
24241 Ors. CAL. ATrY GEN. 28 (1963).
24842 Ors. CAL. ATr'Y GEN. 169 (1963). Before passage of the Rumford Fair
Housing Act the Attorney General had also held that local regulation of discrimination
in housing was not preempted. 40 Ops. ATr'Y GEN. 114 (1962). However, CAL. HEALTH
& SAiETY CODE § 35743, adopted as part of the Rumford Act provided that "it is the
intention of the Legislature to occupy the whole field of regulation encompassed by the
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Nonetheless a number of decisions did preempt local regulations.
Not all of them were based on the Lane decision however. Some were
based on theories of express 24' or direct245 or duplicatoy 246 conflicts, or
relied on pre-Lane precedents such as the license247 and labor248 cases.
For example, m In re Martin,240 the court held that an ordinance regu-
lating the wearing of disguises was m direct conflict with State law
Predictably, the initial impact of the Lane decision was to fore-
close various local regulations m the field of sexual activities. The
courts thus preempted, largely on the authority of Lane, the criminal
aspects of indecent exposure,250 obscene picture exhibitions,25i obscene
exhibits and films, 252 and pornography and perversion.
25 3
The Lane decision was next relied on to preempt the regulation of
intoxication. In In re Koehne25 4 the State supreme court invalidated a
Los Angeles city ordinance which prohibited intoxication in any place
open to public View 255 A State statute, Penal Code section 647(f), pro-
provisions of this part. " The Attorney General held that this preempted the field of
local regulations, but he distinguished the inclusion of a non-discrimnation clause n
school contracts as non-regulatory. 44 Os. CA.L. ATT'Y GEN. 65 (1964).
244 Horn v. Clark, 221 Cal. App. 2d 622, 35 Cal. Rptr. 11 (1963), hearing dented
(rights and duties of pedestrians crossing roadways); People v. Moore, 229 Cal. App.
2d 221, 40 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1964) (local drivers' permits);- 44 OPs. CAL. A7r'y GErN. 65
(1964) (affidavits of nondiscrimination as a condition of applying for a variance).245In re Martin, 221 Cal. App. 2d 14, 34 Cal. Rptr. 299 (1963) (disguises);
Baldwin Park County Water Dist. v. County of Los Angeles, 208 Cal. App. 2d 87, 25
Cal. Rptr. 167 (1962) (water conservation) (partial ground of decision).
246In re Moss, 58 Cal. 2d 117, 121, 23 Cal. Rptr. 361, 363, 373 P.2d 97, 99 (1962)
(criminal aspects of indecent exposure and obscene exhibitions) (concurring opimon).
The Attorney General said, in respect to the Moss case, that it "provides a strong example
of a legislative intent to preempt, as the occupying of the field was literally complete, and
the local ordinance was virtually a duplication of the state statutes." 40 Ops. CAL. AT'ey
Gma. 114, 117 (1962).
24743 Ops. CAL. ATr'y GEN. 115 (1964) (examination of contractors licensed by
state preempted; relying n part on Agnew v. City of Los Angeles, 110 Cal. App. 2d
612, 243 P.2d 73 (1952)).
248 45 Ops. Atty. Gen. 140 (1965) (regulation of employment of professional strike-
breakers during labor disputes preempted, relying largely on Chavez v. Sargent, 52 Cal.
2d 162, 339 P.2d 801 (1959)).
249 221 Cal. App. 2d 14, 34 Cal. Rptr. 299 (1963).
250 In re Moss, 58 Cal. 2d 117, 23 Cal. Rptr. 361, 373 P.2d 425 (1962).
251 Whitney v. Munmcipal Court, 58 Cal. 2d 907, 27 Cal. Rptr. 16, 377 P.2d 80
(1962).
252 People v. Marler, 199 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 889, 18 Cal. Rptr. 923 (App. Dep't
Super. Ct. San Bernardino, 1962).
25 3 Spitcauer v. County of Los Angeles, 227 Cal. App. 2d 376, 38 Cal. Rptr. 710
(1964).
25459 Cal. 2d 646, 30 Cal. Rptr. 809, 381 P.2d 633 (1963).
255 Los ANGELEs, CAL., MuNcirAL CoDn § 41.27(a) (1955). The section also
prohibited intoxication on public streets, sidewalks and the like. Although the ordinance
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hibited intoxication in any public place but did not, in affirmative lan-
guage, prohibit intoxication in any private place open to public view
But the court reasoned: other subsections of Penal Code section 647,
dealing with lewd conduct 256 and begging 257 specifically applied not
only to public places but to private places open to public view; there-
fore, the legislature intentionally left out "in any place open to public
view" Moreover, said' the court, the legislative history of the section
showed that its purpose was to "fill the gap left by the decision in
Newbern25" by providing a uniform, definite standard for police control
of the public drunk "259
Though purporting to rely on Lane,260 the reasoning in the Koehne
case is analogous to the reasoning in the Porterfield line of cases. The
opinion turns on a specific exercise of statutory construction. As the
court put it: "In view of the language of section 647, subdivision (f)
* and the circumstances surrounding its enactment, it is clear that
the Legislature intended to preempt the field."261 The court was thus
determining the general law-that the legislature had, in effect, in-
tended to authorize drunkenness on private property even if in public
view On this reading the Los Angeles ordinance was in direct conflict
with the purpose of the State law
The Koehne case was relied on to strike down similar ordinances in
In re Zorn26 2 and People v. Lopez263 and to preempt the crinnnal
aspects of intoxication in People v. De Young."" The De Young case,
as an alternative theory,265 reasoned, in a parallel fashion to Koehne,
appears to prohibit some of the same conduct prohibited by State law, CAL. PEN. CODE
§ 647(f) requires as an additional element that the intoxicated person be a danger to
himself or others or obstruct public ways. Thus, unless the court were to view the Los
Angeles ordinance as purposefully circumventing the requirements of State law, as in
the Lane case, it could not have resolved the case as a duplicatory conflict.
2 5 6 CAL. PM. CODE § 647(a).
2 57 CAL. PEN. CODE § 647(c).
258In In re Newbemn, 53 Cal. 2d 786, 3 Cal. Rptr. 364, 350 P.2d 116 (1960), the
State supreme court held the existing section regulating intoxication unconstitutional on
the ground that "common drunk was unduly vague.
25959 Cal. 2d 646, 649, 30 Cal. Rptr. 809, 810, 381 P.2d 633, 634 (1963). (Em-
phasis added.)
260 The court did not cite Lane as such but relied on In re Moss, 58 Cal. 2d 117,
23 Cal. Rptr. 361, 373 P.2d 425 (1962) which in turn relied on Lane.
26159 Cal. 2d at 649, 30 Cal. Rptr, at 810, 381 P.2d at 634.
26259 Cal. 2d 650, 30 Cal. Rptr. 811, 381 P.2d 635 (1963).
263 59 Cal. 2d 653, 30 Cal. Rptr. 813, 381 P.2d 637 (1963).
264 228 Cal. App. 2d 331, 39 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1964).
265 The case alternatively relied on a theory more akn to the reasoning in Lane.
The Court said: "Legislative enactments covering the criminal aspects of intoxication
are found in several of the codes and are so extenswe in ther scope that they clearly
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that "by the use of the words 'private property' and 'public or prvate'
m- subdivisions (g) or (h) of section 647 .. these words were, by
implication, purposely omitted by the Legislature from subdivision
(f) . . with the result that it has seen fit to adopt a general scheme
for the regulation of criminal intoxication and that intoxication only in
any public place is crminal." 66
Before turning to the last area of post-Lane activity-the field
of gambling-several other decisions can be noted. In Baldwin Park
County Water Dist. v. County of Los Angeles, 267 the court adopted the
Lane reasoning to conclude that the "Water Code shows an intention
by the Legislature to adopt a general and complete scheme and plan
for conserving water, and regulating the production, control, distri-
bution, and use of water by such water districts as those involved
herem."2 8 And in People v. Bass,269 the court felt compelled by the
Lane precedent to conclude that the field of regulation of the carry-
mg of knives was preempted by implication. Otherwise, reasoned the
court, it would have invalidated only those portions of the ordinance
in question which duplicated State law Lastly, in one of the few
opinions by the Attorney General finding an implied preemption, the
Attorney General ruled that the field of regulating organized camps
was preempted.270
Justice Gibson warned in Lane that "we should not attempt to de-
ternme here whether gambling is a proper subject for local regula-
tion. . "27 The State supreme court declined to reach the issue in
In re Allen, 72 decided the same year as Lane. But Justice McComb,273
argued in dissent, that the field of gambling was not preempted. He
distinguished Lane on the ground that there were "gudes" to the
Legislature's intention in the gambling laws. Specifically, he reasoned,
"the failure of the Legislature" to overturn cases upholding specific
local gambling ordinances, decided "during a period of over 60 years,
show an intention by the Legislature to adopt a general scheme for the regulation of
this subject." Id. at 334, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 488. (Emphasis added.) The use of alternative
theones is frequent in the preemption cases and can lead to confusion.
266 Id. at 336-37, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
267 208 Cal. App. 2d 87, 25 Cal. Rptr. 167 (1962).
268 Id. at 97, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 174.
269 225 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 777, 33 Cal. Rptr. 365 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. Los
Angeles, 1963).
27043 OPs. ATr'y GEN. 261 (1964).
27158 Cal. 2d 99, 110 n.2, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857, 864 n.2, 372 P.2d 879, 904 n.2 (1962).
272 59 Cal. 2d 5, 27 Cal. Rptr. 168, 377 P.2d 280 (1962).
273 With Justice Schauer.
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* . constitutes in itself confirmation of an intention not to preempt
the field."2 74
The courts decided three other gambling cases before reaching the
central question. In each the court found an occupation of the field
relating, variously, to the criminal aspects of wagering on horse
races,2 75 the possession of lottery tickets, 278 and presence at a gambling
house. In none of the cases did the court offer a penetrating reason
for its decision. In In re Loretio,78 the State supreme court reasoned
only that Penal Code section 337a covered a great variety of horse-
race offenses-bookmalcing, operating a bookmaking joint, holding
bets, recording and taking bets, and the like-and implied from this
that the field of wagering on horse races was occupied. People v.
Franks 79 and People v. Cole" 0 in turn specifically relied on Loretizo.
In the Cole case the court argued that the State anti-lottery statute
"may be interpreted to reflect an intention on the part of the Legisla-
ture to direct the crminal sanctions against those who promote lot-
teries rather than to pursue the individual who comes into the posses-
sion of a single ticket."281 Such a policy could be seen in the facts of
the Loretizo and Franks cases as well, a policy analogous to the policy
advanced in the Gibson opinion in Lane, to protect transient citizens
from the effects of a multiplicity of regulations in an area requiring
statewide uniformity 21
2
The State supreme court reached the central question of gambling
in In re Hubbard.213 At issue in the Hubbard case was the validity of a
Long Beach Municipal ordinance284 which prohibited, among others, 285
27459 Cal. 2d at 10, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 171-72, 377 P.2d at 283-84. Justice McComb
relied on a line of cases construing statutes in the light of intervening cases. In the
most recent case n this line, an appellate court said: "The Legislature is assumed to
be aware of existing judicial decisions affecting the subject matter of proposed legisla-
tion." Alhambra Consol. Mines, Inc. v. Alhambra Shuinway Mines, Inc., 239 A.C.A.
651, 657, 49 Cal. Rptr. 38, 43 (1966).
275
1n re Loretizo, 59 Cal. 2d 445, 30 Cal. Rptr. 16, 380 P.2d 656 (1963).
270 People v. Franks, 226 Cal. App. 2d 123, 37 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1964).
277 People v. Cole, 226 Cal. App. 2d 125, 37 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1964).
27859 Cal. 2d 445, 30 Cal. Rptr. 16, 380 P.2d 656 (1963).
279226 Cal. App. 2d 123, 37 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1964).
280 226 Cal. App. 2d 125,37 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1964).
281 Id. at 127-28, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
282 See note 222 supra and accompanying text. See also note, 53 CALIF. L. REv.
902, 907 (1965).
28362 Cal. 2d 119, 41 Cal. Rptr. 393, 396 P.2d 809 (1964).
284 LONG BEAcH, CAL., MUNiCaPAL CoDE § 4140.7 (1955).
2 8 5 The court recognized that the ordinance in part duplicated State law. It there-
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the game of pangumgui, a gambling game not covered by State law
The court viewed the issues as twofold: first, whether the ordinance
was preempted within the meaning of section 11 of article XI of the
California constitution, and, second, the logically prior question,8 6
whether the ordinance concerned a municipal affair within the mean-
ing of section 6 of article XI of the constitution.
On the direct question of preemption the court could have fol-
lowed, but did not, the relatively clear reasoning of Justice McComb
in the Allen case. It reasoned instead that "although the various [state
gaming] code sections . are extensive in their scope [the language
of Lane], they are far from being all inclusive.. It follows that the
state has not preempted the field . "287 This language suggests that
all-inclusiveness is required for occupation, a test winch would in-
validate not only Lane but twenty years of implied preemption deci-
sions. Yet the court did not see fit expressly to overrule a single case
and in fact cited two implication cases with approval.2 88 The confusion
is further compounded in the discussion of preemption of gambling,
which for some reason is separated from the discussion of preemption
of gaming. As part of its reasoning the court argued: "If the Legis-
lature had intended to regulate the play of any game which is ordi-
narily played for money it would have been very simple to say
just that."289 And, further, "since the general laws do not make illegal
all forms of gambling, or even all forms of gaming, they cannot be
said to occupy either field . . unless we adopt the negative type of
argument that is, that by making specific acts illegal the Legislature
intended all other acts of similar character to be of such innocent char-
acter that no local authority might adopt a contrary view To adopt
such a view (for which no authority has been presented) would be
to fly in the face of the well-settled doctrine that the use of specific
fore applied the liberal Commons-Murphy rule of severability to sever the preempted
portions of the ordinance. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
286See note 184 supra and accompanying text.
28762 Cal. 2d at 125, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 397, 396 P.2d at 813.
288 Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. 2d 674, 3 Cal. Rptr. 158, 349 P.2d 974
(1960); Agnew v. City of Los Angeles, 51 Cal. 2d 1, 330 P.2d 385 (1958).
289 62 Cal. 2d at 126, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 397, 396 P.2d at 813. The further extent of
the court's confusion can be seen m the argument following this bootstrap assertion. The
court read two sections together-one banning twelve enumerated "banlang or per-
centage" games, CAL. PEN. CODE § 330, and the other prohibiting the winning of
money by cheating at any game, CAL. PEN. ConE. § 332-to conclude that § "330 was
intended to ban betting or wagering only m regard to a limited number of games."
1btd. Of course the opposite conclusion-that the legislature had intended thereby to
imply an affirmative authorization to play non-mcluded games-is, without more, equally
tenable. The court has again left out the crucial premise.
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words and phrases connotes an intent to exclude that which is not
specifically stated. By limiting the general statutes to regulation or
prohibition of specifically enumerated activities, the Legislature did
not intend to prevent local authority from legislating on those subjects
in regard to wich the former are silent. It follows that the state
has not occupied the entire field of gambling or gaming "290
The court again seems to be ruling out any form of preemption by
implication. For, it seems to be saying, either the general laws must
outlaw all forms of gambling,291 in which case no implication would
be needed, or "we adopt the negative type of argument," which the
court properly rejects as without authority, as indeed the Lane court
did in the second Lane opion.292 The court, by this polarization of
reasoning, leaves out all of those forms of reasoning by implication
which do not involve an implication from mere legislative action.
293
The confusion of the court's reasoning is compounded by an un-
explainable venture into the field of municipal affairs. The holding of
non-preemption would appear to settle the matter. Until the Abbott
case the provisions of section 6 of article XI of the Califorma consti-
tution which prohibit general law supersession over "municipal affairs"
were considered to be logically distinct from the preemption pro-
visions of section 11 of article XI, which require general law super-
session over conflicting local regulations. Under the settled law, a
holding that a municipal regulation was a section 6 "municipal affair"
would preclude a section 11 determination of preemption. But the
Hubbard court not only failed to explain the necessity for examination
into the question of mumcipal affairs but stated that "preemption or
full occupation of the field may become one test of whether a
given subject is a municipal affair."29' The court thus plunged back
into a confusion begun in Abbott2 95 and repudiated in Lane.96
290 Id. at 126-27, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 398, 396 P.2d at 814. (Emphasis added.)
291 The court must have m mind only State prohibitory enactments, for it cannot
mean that an occupation can only take place by prohibition. For there are obvious cases
of complete occupation which do not involve prohibitions, as where the State affirma-
tively and expressly authorizes some conduct.
292 See note 214 supra and accompanying text.
293 The confusion is compounded by the fact that the court seemingly cites with
approval the prior implied occupation cases of Loretizo and Cole. The court said: "While
they [the State code sections on gambling] may include complete regulation of horse
racing [Loretizo] and certainly prohibit all forms of lottery [Cole]. "62 Cal. 2d
at 125, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 397, 396 P.2d at 813.
294 62 Cal. 2d at 127, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 398, 396 P.2d at 814. For the treatment of
the "municipal affairs" factor in Lane see note 221 supra.
295 See note 184 supra and accompanying text.
296 Justice Peters appears to use a similar reasoning in Professional Fire Fighters,
Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 276, 32 Cal. Rptr. 830, 384 P.2d 158 (1963).
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One possible explanation suggests itself. In Abbott the court, per
Justice Peters, stated that a "city has no power to legislate upon matters
which are not of a local nature ,"297 a position which appeared to
return the court to the days when the powers granted by section 11
were implicitly viewed as only local m nature. There would thus be
a superficial resemblance between the confinement of section 11 power
to "mumcipal affairs" and the section 6 guarantee of power over
"municipal affairs." To reverse the logical direction of the confusion
would be to view the limitation on section 11 powers encompassed by
the law of preemption as a definition of "municipal affairs" m section 6.
This appears to be one facet of the court's reasoning, per Justice Peters,
m Hubbard.
Ill. The Politics of Preemption: Civil Liberties,
Home Rule and the Balkanization
of Liberty
The reaction of local government officials to the Lane decision was
vigorous and sustained and involved attempts to amend section 11
of article XI, including the use of an initiative petition, appeals to the
Governor to make preemption the subject of special legislative con-
sideration, and a continuing drumfire of public protest.298 Its impor-
tance can be seen in the fact that from the adoption of section 11 of
article XI m 1879 until the Lane decision m 1962, no effort was made
to amend section 11 or the fundamental law of preemption. 99 Yet the
movement engendered by Lane, though parsed in the rhetoric of home
rule, is quite unlike the home rule movement of the last century The
original home rule movement grew out of a festering reaction to legis-
lative domination of the most minute details of municipal affairs and
the common law rule of absolute legislative supremacy 3 00 By contrast,
the anti-Lane movement is largely confined to concern over crime, the
criminal law and police practices. Its roots are m the larger issue of
civil liberties and judicial supervision of the conduct of the police.
The proper starting point for understanding the current controversy
over preemption is the 1955 decision of the State supreme court in
297 Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. 2d 674, 681, 3 Cal. Rlptr. 158, 163, 349
P.2d 974, 979 (1960).
298 See note 3 supra.
299 Tbis conclusion is based upon an examination of the available legislative records,
going back to 1907, contained in the law library of the University of California at
Berkeley.800
McBAnq, THE LAw AND THE PRAcTicE OF MumcmAL Hom Ru 1-17 (1916).
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People v. Cahan.30 1 The Cahan case held that evidence obtained in
violation of constitutional guarantees against unreasonable searches
and seizures is inadmissible in a criminal trial on the issue of the guilt
of the accused. It began a revolution in the role of the courts in super-
vising police conduct by focusing the attention of the courts on the
hitherto irrelevant procedures of arrest and search and seizure.
The Cahan case set off an enormous effort by law enforcement
agencies to repeal the decision by statutory enactment, on the theory
that the exclusionary rule was merely an exercise of the supervisory
powers of the courts. But the legislature rebuffed attempts to repeal
or circumvent the exclusionary rule at its 1957,02 195903 and 196104
sessions. The June 1961 decision of the United States Supreme Court
in Mapp v. Ohio,303 deciding that the exclusionary rule is constitution-
ally required, largely halted further attempts at direct repeal. But a
similar pattern of judicial decision and legislative rebuff occurred as
to other issues of police procedure. For example, efforts to repeal
statutorily the Priestly rule306 relating to the confidentiality of mfor-
mants, though ultimately. successful, 30 7 were repulsed by the legislature
M 1959,308 1961,309 and 1963.310 The legislature was similarly unre-
sponsive to other demands for increased police power. In 1963, for
example, the legislature refused to pass legislation winch would give
the prosecution unilateral powers of criminal discoveryail authorize
the search of cars or homes at a distance from the arrest,312 conceal
the identity of narcotic informants,31i authorize the use of wiretapping
30144 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
302 See, e.g., A.B. 1857 (1957) (bill passed but amended in senate to delete provi-
sions allowing police officers to detain individuals for questioning on vague grounds);
S.B. 233 (1957) (allowed forcible entry in serving search warrant).
303 See, e.g., S.B. 728 (1959) (repeal of exclusionary rule as to evidence of crines
involving narcotics).
304 See, e.g., A.C.A. 3 (1961) (repeal of exclusionary rule); A.C.A. 15 (1961)
(permitted use of certain narcotic evidence seized outside of dwelling); A.B. 208 (1961)
(repeal of exclusionary rule); A.B. 308 (1961) (repeal of exclusionary rule); S.B. 82
(1961) (repeal of exclusionary rule); S.B. 1378 (1961) (permitted use of certain
evidence seized from vehicle).
305 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
306 Priestly v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 812, 330 P.2d 39 (1958).
307 CaL Stats. 1965, ch. 299, § 1, at 1334, amending CAL. CoDE Civ. Paoc. § 1881
and adding CAr.. EvDENcE CoDE, § 1042(c).
308 S.B. 524 (1959).
309 S.B. 80 (1961).
8i0A.B. 2553 (1963).
311 S.B. 556 (1963).
812 S.B. 445 (1963).
SiSA.B. 2553 (1963).
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devices, 14 provide for compulsory blood tests of alleged drunk
drivers, 15 and grant immunity m misdemeanor cases m lieu of the
privilege against self-mcrimmation.3 16 Moreover, attempts to amend
State legislation to grant broader police powers in fields preempted
by judicial decision were likewise unsuccessful. For example, efforts to
require registration of additional crimmal offenders (Abbott) were
largely defeated in 1961, 317 1963,318 and 1965."'1 Though police agen-
cies scored some successes the legislature largely failed to respond to
efforts to overturn civil liberties decisions m the field of police
practices.
The role of the courts m the protection of individual liberty, and
the refusal of the State legislature to nullify judicial action, explains,
I believe, the real importance of the current preemption controversy
The Lane decision was not a novel addition to the law of preemption.
Nor did the clamor for change abate after the apparent retrenchment
of the Hubbard decision. Lane did signal, however, the willingness of
the courts to foreclose, as to important areas of the criminal law, the
last avenue of relief from the stringencies of judicial intervention in
police practices. The potentiality for municipal circumvention of the
search and seizure laws is illustrative. The Los Angeles resorting ordi-
nance overturned in Lane was a well-advertised 320 attempt to elilm-
nate the necessity of proving the element of consideration in the
crime of prostitution.32 ' This device had been utilized before, in an
obscenity ordinance.22 And, according to the City Attorney of Los
Angeles, it was the motivating reason behind a municipal ordinance,
struck down in the Loretizo case,323 punishing the mere possession of
a betting marker. He said:
314 S.B. 781 (1963).
$15 A.B. 566 (1963).
316S.B. 424 (1963).
317A.B. 1688, 2127, 2626 (1961); S.B. 81, 338 (1961). (narcotic addicts and
offenders).
318S.B. 477 (1963) (arsomsts), A.B. 3051 (1963) (felons, narcotic addicts), S.B.
447 (1963) (certain sex offenses), A.B. 1357 (1963) (lewd and lascivious conduct).
31iA.B. 1864 (1965) (addict), A.B. 1945 (1965) (felons).
320 See note 226 supra and accompanying text.
321See note 228 supra.
3 2 2 In People v. Smith, 161 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 860, 327 P.2d 636 (App. Dep't
Super. Ct. Los Angeles, 1958), rev'd on first amendment grounds, Smith v. Califorma,
361 U.S. 147 (1959), a municipal court upheld, as not preempted, a Los Angeles
city ordinance winch eliminated the element of scienter. The court said: "The city
ordinance is more restrictive than the Penal Code, section 311. Under the Penal Code
section scienter is required." 161 Cal. App. 2d Supp. at 865, 327 P.2d at 639.
8231n re Loretizo, 59 Cal. 2d 445, 30 Cal. Rptr. 16, 380 P.2d 656 (1963).
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In view of the many restrctions being placed upon the police in
connection with search and seizure, in some cases it is impossible to
obtain sufficient legally admissible evidence to prove a bookmaking
charge; that is, the actual placing of bets. Yet in many cases large
numbers of betting markers are found. Our ordinance prohibiting the
possession of such articles was very effective.
3 24
For these and other reasons a shift in power from the courts and
the legislature to mumcipal government could work a substantive
change in the criminal law and m the powers of law enforcement agen-
cies. The chef proposal for this shift in power was put forth by the
League of Califoria Cities. As proposed at the 1963325 and 1965328
sessions of the legislature, the League proposal would amend section
11 of article XI of the Califorma constitution, as follows:
Any county, city, city and county, or town, may make and enforce
within its limits all such local, police, sanitary, and other regulations
as are not in conflict with general laws. Such regulations shall be in
conflict with general law only in the following cases:
1. When the regulation duplicates general law.
2. When the regulation authorizes or purports to authorize that
which is expressly prohibited by general law.
3. When the regulation prohibits or purports to prohibit that which
is expressly permitted by general law.
4. When there is a comprehenswe scheme of legislation on the same
subject by general law, and such general law:
(a) Expressly provides that it has occupied the entire field of
such legislation; or
(b) Expressly prohibits other and further regulation in the field
of such legislation.
The League amendment, if adopted, would overturn two decades
of precedents. It would reverse the Porterfield 2 7 and Chavez3 28 line
of implied general law cases for it would preclude (in subsections
2 and 3) a direct conflict not based upon an express permission or
prohibition. It would reverse the implied occupation cases from
Horwith3 29 through Tolman UO and Abbott 31 to Lane because subsec-
324 Statement of Roger Arnebergh, City Attorney of Los Angeles, Before the As-
sembly Committee on Criminal Procedure, Sacramento, Califorma, September 21, 1965.
325 A.C.A. 30 (1963); S.C.A. 12 (1963).
3
2 8 A.C.A. 2 (1965); S.C.A. 13 (1965).
3 2 7
1n re Porterfield, 28 Cal. 2d 91, 168 P.2d 706 (1946).
328 Chavez v. Sargent, 52 Cal. 2d. 162, 339 P.2d 801 (1959). See the text under
part II A supra.
329 1Horwith v. City of Fresno, 74 Cal. App. 2d 443, 168 P.2d 767 (1946).
33o Tolman v. Underhill, 39 Cal. 2d 708, 249 P.2d 280 (1952). See text part II B1
supra.
331 Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. 2d 674, 3 Cal. Rptr. 158, 349 P.2d 974
(1960). See text under part II B 2 supra.
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tion 4 would permit an occupation of a field only by an express decla-
ration of occupation, and then only if "there is a comprehensive scheme
of legislation on the same subject by general law" In short, all forms
of implication would be ruled out of a preemption decision: the nnpli-
cation that a state regulatory license implies an intent to preclude
additional local regulation; 332 the implication based upon legislative
history and statutory construction;'-" the implication based upon legis-
lative reaction in the face of judicial decisions; 3 4 the implication based
upon court-determined need for statewide uniformity;8 5 and the
implication based upon the clearly perceived policy of the legisla-
ture.8 6 Only a duplicatory conflict, a direct conflict with an. express
general law, or an absence of power a particular subject matter 37
would vitiate a municipal enactment. In short, local governments
would be empowered38 to adopt loyalty oaths and criminal registra-
tion regulations, regulate sexual conduct, and adopt regulatory licens-
ing of State licensees and local right-to-work ordinances, to name but
a few examples. And they would be empowered to overturn the gen-
eral law insofar as it rested upon a court-determinmed policy, a statutory
construction, or similar non-express and court implied reasoning. In
effect, the courts would be made subject to special rules when de-
ciding questions of preemption 89 and the legislature could occupy
a field only with great prescience, careful drafting, and (possibly) a
8 2 Horwith v. City of Fresno, 74 Cal. App. 2d 443, 168 P.2d 767 (1946). And
see cases cited note 129, supra.
83 See, e.g., In te Loretizo, 59 Cal. 2d 445, 30 Cal. Bptr. 16, 380 P.2d 656 (1963).
The League amendment would invalidate even the clearest land of inference as to
legislative intent. For example, the following legislative history would be proscribed.
During the course of the 1961 passage of the current California obscenity law (CAL.
PEN. CoDE §§ 311-12) an express provision was added to the measure in the Senate
judiciary Committee to state: "This chapter shall not be construed to evidence an mten-
tion to preempt the field of obscenity " A.B. 1979 (1961), amended in senate June
13, 1961. This express statement of non-preemption was deleted from the measure
when the bill reached the Senate floor. A.B. 1979 (1961), amended in senate June 14,
1961.
34 In re Allen, 59 Cal. 2d 5, 10, 27 Cal. Rptr. 168, 171-72, 377 P.2d 280, 283-84
(1962) (dissenting opinion of McComb, J.).
885 See, generally, the loyalty oath cases, Abbott and Lane.
336 In re Porterfield, 28 Cal. 2d 91, 115-16, 168 P.2d 706, 721-22 (1946).
887 See, e.g., Hall v. City of Taft, 47 Cal. 2d 177, 183, 302 P.2d 574, 578 (1956)
(alternative ground).
88 Although a number of the municipal ordinances invalidated by implied pre-
emption decisions have not been removed from the books, the passage of the League
amendment would probably not act automatically to restore them. See Banaz v. Smith,
133 Cal. 102, 104, 65 Pac. 309, 310 (1901); cf. Busch v. Turner, 26 Cal. 2d 817, 822,
161 P.2d 456, 459 (1945).
8s 9See text accompanying notes 120-24 supra.
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court determination of comprehensiveness. Such a vast change could
only have disastrous results on the stability and certainty of the law, 40
far exceeding the confusion engendered by the Hubbard case 41 or in-
herent in the very nature and complexity of the preemption law
There are, however, important arguments advanced to support
the League amendment, and these require consideration. Has the
doctrine of implied preemption thrust the courts into an improper
policy-making role? 42 It is clear that important policy decisions have
undergirded many of the preemption decisions. The courts have used
the principle of statewide uniformity as a means of infusing constitu-
tional principles into the law of preemption;3 43 and it seems that
preemption has been used as a sub-constitutional rationale for an other-
wise difficult question of constitutional law All of this raises the ques-
tion, whether there are, as Professor Sandalow put it, "compelling
reasons why a court should not be required to pay the same degree of
deference to ordinances or charter provisions as to statutes enacted
by the state legislature." 44 Professor Sandalow answered the question
in the affirmative.
The issue is not whether local citizens are assumed to be less wise
when acting locally than when they are acting at the state level;
rather, it is whether political processes at the local level are adequate
to achieve or protect the basic community values which determine
the appropnate distribution of governmental power within the state.
To the extent that local political processes are inadequate to secure
340 Other commentators have come to much the same conclusion after examining
the League proposals. See, e.g., Note, 53 CALIw. L. REv. 902, 910 (1965).
341See the text accompanying note 296 supra.
342See note 3 supra.
343The federal courts have also used the doctrine of preemption as a subconstitu-
tional protection of constitutional values. In Pennsylvama v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497
(1956), for example, the United States Supreme Court held that the federal Smith
Act (18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1964)) occupied the field of sedition with respect to parallel
state legislation. But compare Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959) which held that
states may legitimately conduct investigations and prosecutions for sedition against the
State itself. Id. at 76. The United States Supreme Court, m a recent opinion, has made
overt use of the doctrine of preemption to embody first amendment guarantees. In
Lum v. United Plant Guard Workers, 86 S. Ct. 657 (1966), the Court adopted the
first amendment test from the decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964), which limited libel actions for criticism of public officials to malicious
falsehoods, and applied it to libel actions growing out of certain labor disputes, as a
statutory policy of the National Labor Relations Act. The Court said: "The standards
enunciated in New York Times v. Sullivan are adopted by analogy, rather than
under constitutional compulsion. We apply the malice test to effectuate the statutory
design with respect to preemption." Id. at 664. (Emphasis added.)
344 Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the
Courts, 48 Mnm. L. REv. 643, 710-11 (1964).
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these values, the courts may be able to maxmize community values
by shifting the level of decision from municipal to state government.
It is for this reason that a court . may justifiably deny a municipal-
ity power to enact 'higher-.e., more restrictive-moral standards
than are established by state law. Although the state may have no
'interest in lowering the moral tone of any area,' there is a community
interest in maximizmg liberty which may be threatened by allowing
local majorities to impose their own conception of morality upon local
dissidents. 45
There are, according to Sandalow, certain values which are funda-
mental enough to warrant interference with only on the basis of a
statewide concensus but which do not necessarily justify an exercise
of constitutional adjudication. "Constitutional limitations, after all,
are normally considered to mark only the outer limits of government
power, not to define its optimum degree of exercise."3 4 The courts
have a responsibility therefore to effectuate and perfect fundamental
liberties beyond the mimmum prescribed by the constitution. The
Abbott and Lane cases, and the loyalty oath cases, are examples of
this responsibility An additional example could be offered. Justice
Brennan once commented on the importance of uniformity of obscenity
regulation to the preservation of free speech. He said "suppression of
a particular book or film in one locality would deter its dissemination
in other localities where it might be held not obscene, since sellers
and exhibitors would be reluctant to risk criminal conviction in testing
the variation between the two places." 47 The Califorma law of obscen-
ity348 occupies the field 349 on the authority of the Lane decision. But
a multiplicity of local obscenity regulations5 0 would produce the kind
345 Id. at 711-12.
346 Id. at 713.
8
47 Jacobellis v. Oluo, 378 U.S. 184, 194 (1964) (separate opinion of Justice
Brennan). Justice Brennan made the statement in arguing that "community" in the "con-
temporary community standards" element of his constitutional definition of obscenity
should be a national community. "We do not see how any 'local' definition of. the
'community' could properly be employed in delineating the area of expression that is
protected by the Federal Constitution." Id. at 193. Likewise, it is difcult to see how
anything less than a statewide standard should suffice.
348 CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 311-12.
349 In re Moss, 58 Cal. 2d 117, 23 Cal. Rptr. 361, 373 P.2d 425 (1962); Whitney
v. Municipal Court, 58 Cal. 2d 907, 27 Cal. Rptr. 16, 377 P.2d 80 (1962); People v.
Marler, 199 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 889, 18 Cal. Rptr. 923 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. San
Bernardino, 1962).
350 Most of the cities in Califorma, presumably, have at various times adopted
their own obscenity ordinances. See, e.g., OAxLAND, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 3-4.02,
3-4.16 (1964); SACAmENTO, CAL., MuNiciPAL CODE § 5.7; SAN DiGo, CAL., MUNIci-
PAL. CoDE § 33.1638 (1959). Some of the ordinances are quite expansive. For example,
Los ANGEms, CAL., MuNIcnPAL CODE § 41.04(b) (1955), makes it a crime, among
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of deterrence of protected speech wich concerned Justice Brennan.
And it is nportant to note that pressures for greater regulation of
obscenity have focused not only on the elimination of the phrase in
the Califorma law-"utterly without redeeming social importance"-
which is protective of literary and other important values351 but upon
freeing municipal governments to enact their own regulations.
52
It could be countered, though, that even under the League amend-
ment, the legislature could overturn any undue incursion by a local
interest upon individual liberty; that is to say, the legislature could
expressly preclude local regulation In a given field. But even assuming
that the test of comprehensiveness in the League amendment, winch
presumably is subject to judicial determination, offers no obstacle, this
argument ignores the structure and dynamics of the legislative process
and the defensive advantage winch they give to the municipal interest.
Professor Sandalow recognized this problem as well. He said: "Nor
can reliance be placed upon legislative action after the exercise of
municipal initiative. The relatively narrow impact of many local mea-
sures may not arouse sufficient general interest to overcome legislative
Inertia."353 In other words, it is far easier for (say) the League of Cali-
forma Cities to prevent legislative reversal of a municipal enactment,
even though violative of some fundamental interest, than it would be
to persuade the whole of the legislature and the governor to enact
the identical measure. The initiative, time, and legislative advantage
would serve the interests of municipal government.
It is important to stress that the argument for judicial protection
of fundamental values through the law of preemption places the
courts in a position, as to the determination of such values, midway
between municipal and state lawmaking bodies. The courts operate,
so to speak, interstitially in the adoption of a not-so-"ugher" law, pre-
cluding municipal regulation but subordinate to express state legisla-
tive policy including express policies of preemption. In any event, this
view of the role of the courts places the legislature ultimately as the
superior policy-making authority
others, for "any place of business to display any picture of any nude human
figure or wherein the female breast is discernible." And § 41.13(b) makes it a
crime for any person to '"nowingly and wilfully view or remain present where any
motion picture depicting any obscene, immoral act is being shown. "
Moreover, some of the ordinances provide for the seizure of obscene materials. See,
eg., SAN DIEo, CAL., MUNIcIPAL CODE § 56.27 (1953); Los ANrGELrs, CAL., MUNIcI.L
CODE § 41.13(c) (1955).
851 See, e.g., A.B. 207, 1278, 1312, 1313, 2152, 2153 (1965); S.B. 1284 (1965).
352See, e.g., A.B. 1884 (1965).
853 Sandalow, supra note 344, at 714.
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The politics of preemption has to do at heart with the substantive
issues of the crminmal law and individual liberty And it is intimately
bound up with the relations of our organs of government. The courts
are the traditional protectors of liberty. The State legislature increas-
ingly reflects the cosmopolitan blend of pressures for more law enforce-
ment and the demands of minority groups for greater rights. Municipal
governments, though varying widely, are traditionally more sympa-
thetic to the demands of police agencies. Police administration is,
after all, still largely a local affair. Police officials, some of whom are
elected, occupy important positions in municipal government. The
controversy over preemption is a product of the interplay between
substantive issues and the structure of government.
Conclusion
The doctrine of preemption by implication was not a creation of
the Lane decision. It began in the rhetoric of the early law, was re-
vealed in early decisions, and developed, at least as early as 1946,
into two lines of cases, one focusing on the intention of the legislature
to occupy a field, and the other on the meaning of "general laws." In
each line the courts fused together questions of legislative intent, not
appreciably different from those involved in non-preemption cases,
and questions of policy analogized from underlying constitutional
principles. From the adoption of section 11 of article XI of the Cal-
forma constitution in 1879-which thrust upon the courts the constitu-
tional duty of determining whether municipal regulations "conflict
with general laws"-until today, the courts have been faced with the
responsibility of reconciling the respective powers of State and local
government, a task which must produce, of necessity, uncertainty and
decisions which are sui geners of the field at issue. It is diMcult to
conceive that the situation could be otherwise or that it could be
changed by facile resort to a constitutional amendment.
The Lane case did not fundamentally alter the law of preemption
and thus could not, by itself, explain the magnitude and intensity of
the municipal opposition which it engendered and the drastic pro-
posals for constitutional reform. The better explanation can be found
in the larger issue of police practices and the actions of courts and
legislature m expanding the rights of individuals. In this light, the
fundamental controversy is not one, strictly speaking, over preemption
or home rule but over the substantive policies of the criminal law and
procedure. Had the Lane case dealt with a different subject matter,
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as did dozens of preemption by implication cases before it, there would
have been no movement for reform.
The more important issue brought to light by the controversy
concerns the propriety of judicial implementation of constitutional
principles via the law of preemption. The crucial value here is the im-
portance of individual liberty and its vulnerability to municipal bal-
kamzation. Only a standard of statewide uniformity can fully imple-
ment the values of free speech and due process, the rights of privacy,
and other fundamental values. The doctrine of preemption by implica-
tion is necessary to their fulfillment.

